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The end of the Cold War and the opening of selected archives in both Eastern 
and Western Europe provide scholars the opportunity to study this period with greater 
accuracy and detail than was previously possible. This study sought to determine the 
feasibility of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe in 1987 through the 
examination of the factors that would have affected such an operation. The factors are 
the reliability of military allies, the potential for the use of nuclear weapons, Warsaw 
Pact strategy, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy, operations on 
Europe’s flanks, naval operations, aerial operations, reinforcement and mobilization, 
readiness, terrain and weather, and ground forces. These factors were examined through 
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the use of secondary literature on military forces in the Cold War as well as primary 
sources such as government documents and publications. After each of these factors 
have been analyzed then conclusions will be drawn about the probable course of such a 
conflict in Central Europe. The argument will be made that nuclear weapons would not 
have been used in the first stages of a war by NATO or the Warsaw Pact. NATO’s 
ability will be shown to be sufficient to successfully defend most of West Germany. As 
this was not the conclusion of many defense analysts during the Cold War this research 
highlights the importance of withholding judgments about the capabilities of military 
forces until all relevant data is available.   
 
 iv





 This work would not have been possible with the aid and support of many 
different individuals and organizations. The Office of Honors Programs at Texas A&M 
University and the Melbern G. Glassock Center for Humanities Research both provided 
funding that made the procurement of several key books and articles possible. My 
advisor, Dr. Donald Curtis, supported me throughout this project and insightfully 
suggested that I examine the reliability of the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
Kallie Gallagher and the Interlibrary Loan staff at the Sterling C. Evans Library 
helpfully and cheerfully completed my endless requests for books and articles. My 
roommate, John Luck, deserves thanks for putting up with my less than predictable work 
schedule. My parents, Matt and Lauri Williamson, and my siblings, Heather and Travis, 
also deserve recognition for their support and encouragement. Any errors in this work 












TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………….…. vi 
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………….…….. ix 
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………… x 
GLOSSARY…………………………………………………………. xi 
CHAPTER  
 1 INTRODUCTION: WHY THE LATE 1980s?.………….… 1 
  NATO’s Only Chance….……………………….…....... 3 
 2 RELIABILITY OF MILITARY ALLIES……………....….. 12 
  NATO and Reliability….……………………….…....... 12 
  The Warsaw Pact and Reliability...……………………. 15 
 
3 THE NON-NUCLEAR ARGUMENT…..……………...….. 20 
 
4 WARSAW PACT STRATEGY……………………………. 28 
 




6 EUROPE’S FLANKS………………………………………. 54 
  Norway…………………………………………….…....... 55 
  The Mediterranean………………………...…….…....... 57 
  Conclusion...…………………………………….…....... 59 
 
7 NAVAL FORCES AND OPERATIONS…………………... 60 
  Maritime Roles………………………...………….…....... 60 
  Soviet Maritime Forces...……………..………….…....... 67 
  NATO Maritime Forces..……………..………….…....... 78 
  Conclusion...……………………….…..………….…....... 91 
 
8 THE WAR IN THE AIR……………………………………. 95 
  Organization…………………………………….…....... 95 
  Doctrine and Tactics…………………………….…....... 98 
  Weather………………………………….……….…....... 104 
  Numerical Strength..…………………………….…....... 105 
  Quality….………..……………………………….…....... 109 
  Conclusion……………………………………….…....... 111 
 
9 MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT………...…… 113 
  Warning Time…..………..……………………….…....... 115 
  European NATO..…………..…………………….…....... 119 
  Overseas NATO..…………...…………………….…....... 133 
  Warsaw Pact………………..…………………….…....... 149 
 
10 READINESS: TRAINING AND LOGISTICS……………. 166 
  Warsaw Pact Logistics………………..………….…....... 167 
  NATO Logistics…..……………...……………….…....... 169 
  Warsaw Pact Training.………………….……….…....... 172 
  NATO Training...………………..……………….…....... 175 
 
11 TERRAIN AND WEATHER………………………………. 177 
  Weather……………..…………………………….…....... 177 
 
 viii
  Terrain….……………...………………………….…....... 178 
  NORTHAG…..………..………………………….…....... 180 
  CENTAG.……………...………………………….…....... 186 
  Conclusion..……………………………………….…....... 191 
 
12 GROUND FORCES………………………………………... 193 
  Location and Size………..….…………………….…....... 193 
  Force to Space Ratios..……..…………………….…....... 198 
  Equipment………………..……………………….…....... 201 
  Conclusion………………..……………………….…....... 203 
 
13 CONCLUSION……………………..…………………..…... 204 
REFERENCES CITED…...………………………………………….. 210 
REFERENCES CONSULTED………………………………………. 219 
APPENDIX I WARSAW PACT TREATY……………..…………... 229 
APPENDIX II NATO TREATY…………………………...………… 234 
APPENDIX III CHURCHILL ON MOBILIZATION………………. 239 












LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE  Page 
1 Soviet Invasion Plan……………………………………………... 35 
2 NATO Corps Sectors…………………………………………….. 47 
3 Soviet Air Defenses….…………………………………………... 109 
4 West German Forces………...…………………………………… 121 
5 Belgian Units in Belgium…..……………………………………. 124 
6 Dutch Forces in Netherlands……...………………………… ….. 126 
7 French Forces in France…….……………………………………. 129 
8 Soviet Forces in East Germany and Poland……………………… 154 
9 Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia………………………………… 155 
10 Soviet Forces in Hungary………………………………………... 155 
11 Soviet Military Districts……………………………………….. 158 
12 Western USSR Military Districts………………………………... 159 




LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE  Page 
1 Soviet and Warsaw Pact Naval Deployments...……...…………... 69 
2 NATO Naval Deployments I.....……………………...………….. 80 
3 NATO Naval Deployments II..…………………………………... 81 
4 Comparative Naval Strength...…………………………………… 94 
5 Summer Weather in Germany…...………………………………. 104 
6 NATO Aerial Strength…..……...………………………….…... 106 
7 Warsaw Pact Aerial Strength….…………………………………. 107 
8 Aircraft for US Reinforcement…………...……………………… 141 
9 NATO Ground Forces After Mobilization.……………………… 148 
10 Non-Soviet Pact Forces...………………………………………... 151 
11 Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe..……………………………….. 156 
12 Soviet Forces in the USSR……...………………………………... 160 
13 Warsaw Pact Invasion Forces…...……………………………….. 194 
14 NATO Defensive Forces………………………………………… 195 





Army: Military unit composed of 2 or more corps, usually has over 100,000 soldiers 
Army Group: Military unit composed of 2 or more armies 
ASW: Antisubmarine Warfare, systems, weapons, or ships primarily designed or trained 
to detect, track, and engage enemy submarines 
AWACS: Airborne Early Warning and Control System, US aircraft equipped with long 
range airborne radar designed to coordinate activities of other allied aircraft 
Battalion: Military unit with 600-1000 soldiers, composed of 3-4 companies 
Battle Force: US Navy formation composed of 2 or more carrier battle groups 
BB: Battleship, a large heavily armored warship of 35-50,000 tons armed with long 
range 13-16 inch guns and other short and medium range guns, designed to engage 
enemy ships and provide fire support for ground operations 
BOAR: British Army of the Rhine, British forces stationed in West Germany 
Brigade: Military unit with 4-6,000 soldiers, composed of 3-5 battalions 
C-5: Long range strategic US air transport 
C-141: Long range strategic US air transport 
C-130: Medium range strategic US air transport 
CAST: Canadian Air Sea Transportable Brigade, brigade of Canadian forces tasked to 
Norway in wartime 
CG: Guided Missile Cruiser, a medium sized warship of 7-12,000 tons powered by 
diesel engines and armed with guided missiles, guns, and torpedoes designed to engage 
enemy ships, submarines, aircraft and missiles, occasionally carried 1-2 ASW 
helicopters 
CGN: Guided Missile Cruiser, similar to a CG except powered by nuclear engines 
CHG: Guided Missile Helicopter Cruiser, similar to a CG carrying roughly 6-15 
helicopters and fewer weapons 
Common User Fleet: Commercial transports owned by US maritime companies who 
pledged their ships to the US military for sealift in wartime 
Corps: Military unit composed of 2 or more divisions 
Counter-force: A strategic nuclear targeting strategy where nuclear weapons are 
targeted on enemy nuclear weapons and their delivery systems 
 
 xii
Counter-value: A strategic nuclear targeting strategy where nuclear weapons are 
targeted on enemy cities in order to maximize enemy civilian deaths 
CV: Aircraft Carrier, a large diesel powered warship, weighing 30-60,000 tons and 
carrying 20-75 aircraft and several helicopters, armed with short range air defense 
weapons, designed for use in concert with escorting warships 
CVBG: Carrier Battle Group, composed of one aircraft carrier and 5-10 escorting 
warships 
CVH: Helicopter Carrier, A large diesel powered warship with a complement of 6-20 
helicopters designed primarily for ASW and amphibious operations as a part of a larger 
group of warships 
CVN: Nuclear Aircraft Carrier, a very large nuclear powered warship, weighing 90-
100,000 tons carrying 70-90 aircraft and several helicopters, armed with short range air 
defense weapons, designed for use in concert with escorting warships 
DD: Destroyer, a diesel powered warship smaller than a cruiser, armed with some 
combination of missile, guns, and torpedoes, designed as an escort to engage enemy 
ships, submarines, and aircraft, sometimes carrying 1-2 helicopters 
DDG: Guided Missile Destroyer, similar to a destroyer but primarily armed with guided 
missiles and torpedoes 
Division: Basic military unit with 10-18,000 soldiers, composed of 3-4 brigades or 
regiments 
FA: Fast Attack Craft, a very small warship of 100-400 tons, armed with short range 
anti-ship missiles, designed for short range operations in coastal waters 
FF: Frigate, a small warship designed for patrol and coastal work, weighing less than a 
destroyer, primarily designed and armed to engage enemy submarines and ships, armed 
with short range anti-ship and anti-air missiles, sometimes carrying 1-2 helicopters 
FFG: Guided Missile Frigate, a warship similar to a frigate but armed with medium 
range guided missiles 
KC-10: Long range US air to air refueling tanker  
LOC: Lines of Communication, routes connecting military forces to their sources of 
supplies and reinforcements  
LRMP: Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft, a naval aircraft, usually propeller driven, 
designed for ASW operations carrying sonar buoys, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles 
MAB: Marine Amphibious Brigade, US Marine Brigade tasked to the reinforcement of 
Norway in wartime 
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MCM: Mine Countermeasures Ship, a small warship with minimal armaments, 
weighing less than 2000 tons, designed to deploy, detect, and destroy mines 
MP: Maritime Patrol Aircraft, similar to a Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft, but 
usually with 2 instead of 4 engines and designed for operations at short and medium 
ranges 
NAEWF: NATO Airborne Early Warning Force, NATO’s multi-national complement 
of AWACS aircraft 
NADGE: NATO Air Defense Ground Environment, NATO’s integrated system of air 
defenses, search radars, interceptors, command and control centers, and communication 
relays 
Passive IR: Infrared detection systems that detect infrared radiation without actively 
scanning 
Ready Reserve Fleet: Transports owned by the US government to be used by the US 
military for strategic sealift and reinforcement in wartime 
SOSUS: Sound Surveillance System, a worldwide network of passive sensors emplaced 
by the US on the seabed on the continental shelf designed to detect submarines and ships 
SS: A diesel powered submarine armed with torpedoes, designed for use in coastal and 
the mid-range ocean in patrol and attack functions 
SSB: Ballistic Missile Submarine, a large diesel powered submarine armed with long 
range nuclear missiles and torpedoes, primarily designed for use in a nuclear war setting 
SSBN: Ballistic Missile Submarine, a nuclear powered submarine similar to an SSB in 
design and armaments 
SSG: Cruise Missile Submarine, a diesel powered submarine, armed with cruise missiles 
and torpedoes designed to attack enemy ships and submarines first with standoff cruise 
missiles 
SSGN: Cruise Missile Submarine, a nuclear powered submarine similar to an SSG in 
design and armaments 
SSN: Nuclear Attack Submarine, A nuclear powered attack, or ‘hunter-killer’, submarine 
armed with torpedoes and sometimes short range anti-ship missiles, designed to attack 
enemy ships and submarines in the deep ocean 
UKMF: United Kingdom Mobile Force, a reinforced mechanized infantry brigade 




WHNS: Wartime Host Nation Support agreement, an agreement between NATO 
members that governs the use of national transport systems to move reinforcing NATO 





INTRODUCTION: WHY THE LATE 1980s? 
 
 
The ability of any study to make meaningful conclusions about the feasibility of 
a Soviet invasion of West Europe is directly tied to the probability that nuclear weapons 
would be employed during the hypothetical conflict. The employment of tactical nuclear 
weapons makes the analysis of the conflict infinitely more difficult because of all the 
attendant factors that come into play. It is not necessary to know the exact target of every 
tactical air strike and every artillery barrage that would take place in order to assess the 
probable outcome of a future conflict. However it is necessary to know, for example, 
whether NATO concentrates its tactical nuclear assault on the Soviet forces facing 
CENTAG or NORTHAG. If publications on tactical nuclear doctrine were clearer then it 
might be possible to make judgments about their employment. The problem is that 
nations are extremely reticent to proclaim their nuclear plans of any sort. They are much 
                                                 
1 This thesis follows the style and format of The Journal of Military History.  
 
 2
more willing to describe how they plan to fight a conventional war and so that 
information is much more readily available. 
At the same time that the use of tactical nuclear weapons on its own makes an in 
depth study of potential conflict in Europe difficult, the possibility of strategic nuclear 
weapons use makes such a study almost meaningless. One’s assumptions about the 
relationship between tactical and nuclear weapons play into the potential for strategic 
nuclear employment in a conventional conflict scenario. These assumptions are tied to 
doctrine and will be examined in depth later. For now it is sufficient to say that NATO 
and the Soviet Union had differing opinions on this subject. NATO, particularly the 
United States, believed that a limited nuclear war could be fought in Europe with 
resorting to strategic nuclear weapons. NATO’s doctrine called for the use of the US 
strategic nuclear arsenal if their conventional forces were defeated. NATO’s repeated 
attempts to connect the deterrence value of troops on the Inner German Border and the 
US strategic nuclear arsenal demonstrate that they feared the possibility of such a limited 
nuclear war. The Soviets held that such a distinction was artificial and that tactical 
nuclear employment would quickly lead to the terrifying prospect of strategic nuclear 
exchange. It is difficult to see how the tactical use of nuclear weapons on the Central 
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Front in Europe would not have gradually moved into strategic nuclear exchange. France 
and Britain would not view explosions of tactical nuclear weapons over their cities as a 
“limited” nuclear war and would have every reason to respond with their strategic 
systems. At the same time many of the targets that would have been most beneficial for 
NATO to strike with tactical nuclear weapons lay inside the borders of the Soviet Union 
and would not have been regarded as “limited” in nature. Therefore the potential for 
escalation after the tactical nuclear threshold was crossed was high. All this is to say that 
in order to successfully study the possible or probable outcome of a Soviet invasion of 
Western Europe one must focus on the period in which there is the least likelihood for 
nuclear weapons to be employed. While it is impossible to fully rule out the potential for 
their use, the late 1980s present the best opportunity for a meaningful study of this 
scenario. 
NATO’s Only Chance 
The only time during the Cold War in which NATO could be described as 
potentially capable of resisting a Soviet Union was the late 1980s. Realistically NATO 
was not in the same league as the Warsaw Pact until that time period. An examination of 
the balance of forces in Europe throughout the Cold War will substantiate this claim.   
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 Following the end of the Second World War the victorious Allies maintained 
various amounts of conventional forces in Germany for occupation duties. The British, 
American, and French forces were reduced to garrison size rather quickly while the 
Soviets maintained a powerful striking force of veteran divisions in East Germany and 
eastern Poland. The situation was such that by 1948 “12 scattered and under strength 
Western divisions were assumed to be facing a Soviet force of 25 divisions backed by 
another 115-150 divisions in the Soviet Union, all at full battle strength”2. When NATO 
was founded in 1949 the conventional forces available to halt a Soviet attack were 
miniscule. The Allied occupation troops would have been no match for the battle 
hardened divisions the Soviets maintained in East Germany, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia.3 The Western Allies were understandably concerned about their ability 
to defend not only their occupation zones in Germany but also the rest of continental 
Europe from a possible Soviet attack. The response to this conventional imbalance was 
the development of the doctrine of Massive Retaliation by the Truman Administration. 
This called for a minimum deployment of US and NATO forces to Central Europe with 
                                                 
2 William P. Mako, US Ground Forces and the Defense of Europe (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 1983), 7. 
3 Ibid. 7. 
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the understanding that any conventional attack would be met with a strategic nuclear 
assault on the Soviet Union itself. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s NATO 
forces along the IGB (Inner German Border) would have served as little more than a 
tripwire for a US strategic nuclear response.4 According to NATO documents “the most 
important factor in a major war” would be “superiority in atomic weapons.”5 Over time 
the European members of NATO began to question the realism of relying on an 
American President to risk nuclear attack on cities within the continental United States 
for a Soviet incursion into West Germany. 
 Soviet planning in the 1950s and 1960s was based on the assumption that nuclear 
weapons would be employed immediately in any conflict in Europe. Soviet strategists 
understood Massive Retaliation and anticipated that nuclear weapons would be 
introduced early.6 Conventional forces were expanded in order to take advantage of any 
situation in Europe favorable to Communists interests.7 There was little reason to begin 
                                                 
4 Dr. Gregory W Pedlow, "NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969,"  (NATO Historical Office, Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 1997), XIV-XVI. 
5 Ibid., XVIII. 
6 Vojtech Mastny, ed., War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 16-18. 
7 Ibid., 18. 
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a conflict with solely conventional forces only to have the US gain all the advantages of 
nuclear first use. Therefore the Soviets planned to begin their operations with nuclear 
strikes8 followed by a full scale invasion of West Germany and France with 
conventional forces taking advantage of the disruptions and holes created in NATO 
defenses.9 
Eventually the United States transitioned its deterrence posture to that of Flexible 
Response under President Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. With the 
adoption of MC 14/3, otherwise known as the “Flexible Response” doctrine, by the 
NATO Military Committee in 1968 NATO was committed to “credible deterrence, 
effected by confronting any possible, threatened or actual aggression, ranging from 
covert operations to all-out nuclear war, with adequate NATO forces”10 Under Flexible 
Response NATO doctrine called for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons when 
conventional defense is shown to no longer be meaningful due to Soviet action.11 
Secretary McNamara called for increases in NATO conventional forces “in order to 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 46-47. 
9 Ibid., 25. 
10 Pedlow, "NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969," 371. 
11 Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 1. 
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make clear to the Soviets that they could not successfully and quickly attack at the 
conventional level”12 . The European members of NATO were not willing to risk the 
destruction of their native soil and cities through the exchange of tactical nuclear 
weapons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In order to correct this situation they 
began to develop a more robust conventional presence in Germany, such as the 
reinforcement of the British Army of the Rhine (BOAR) and the Bundeswehr, the West 
German Army. This European and American expansion of conventional forces made the 
employment of Allied tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet invasion less 
likely, but the change was not incredibly significant.  Flexible Response will be 
examined in greater detail later but for the moment it will be sufficient to state that the 
doctrine remained NATO’s official defensive policy through the end of the Cold War. 
 The 1970s were a troubled time for NATO as the United States became more and 
more involved in the Vietnam War and conventional forces tasked to NATO received 
less support and equipment as a consequence.13 NATO’s conventional capability 
                                                 
12 James R Golden, Asa A Clark, and Bruce E Arlinghaus, eds., Conventional Deterrence (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1984), 13. 
13 US Congress. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Alliance and Defense Capabilities in Europe, 
100th Cong., 1st sess., October 20 1987, 235-36. 
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declined relative to Soviet capabilities.14 The US involvement in Vietnam severely 
curtailed the maintenance and modernization of the US forces in Europe, V and VII 
Corps.15 Weapons, training, and tactics were focused on counter-insurgency warfare in 
Southeast Asia and not on heavily mechanized operations on the plains of Central 
Europe. At the same time European governments were not as willing to spend the money 
and political capital necessary to maintain their conventional deterrence.16 Great reliance 
was played on the early deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to stem any Soviet 
advance. This focus made the use of Allied nuclear weapons more likely throughout the 
1970s.17 This dependence was also present into the early 1980s18. 
In the early 1980s NATO began to realize that its current conventional defense 
posture practically invited a Soviet invasion due to the deplorable state of Alliance 
                                                 
14 David D Finley, "Conventional Arms in Soviet Foreign Policy," World Politics 33, no. 1 (1980): 17. 
15 Mastny, ed., War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West, 296, 
John Keegan, ed., World Armies, 2nd ed. (Detroit, Michigan: Gale Research Company, 1983), 621. 
16 Finley, "Conventional Arms in Soviet Foreign Policy," 12. 
17 McGeorge Bundy et al., "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs 60, no. 4 (Spring 
1982): 757. 
18 Steven E. Miller and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, eds., Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge Press, 1989), 220. 
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ground forces. One author provides a succinct, yet accurate depiction of the state of 
Flexible Response:  
“The credibility of NATO’s threatened escalation gradually eroded, however, 
with Soviet acquisition of a secure strategic nuclear second-strike capability in the late 
1960s, attainment of strategic parity in the mid-1970s, the modernization and buildup of 
long-range theater nuclear forces beginning in the late 1970s, and the continuing 
modernization and buildup of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons since the 1980s.”19 
As a result of this realization NATO made a series of steady real improvements 
in national defense budgets.20 At a meeting in 1977 NATO defense ministers adopted 
the Long Range Defense Program, a series of improvements in NATO’s conventional 
and nuclear forces.21 In 1985 NATO introduced the Conventional Defense Improvement 
(CDI) Program.22 For example Belgium increased its defense spending 55% between 
1971-1986.23 Several NATO programs begin to standardize logistical structures, aerial 
command and control, and communication systems.24 NATO began to deploy large 
                                                 
19 Gregory Flynn, ed., Soviet Military Doctrine and Western Policy (New York: Routledge, 1989), 364. 
20 Anthony H Cordesman, NATO's Central Region Forces (New York: Jane's Publishing Company 
Limited, 1988), 14. 
21 Jeffrey Boutwell, "Strengthening NATO's Conventional Forces," Bulletin of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences 42, no. 2 (Nov. 1988): 6. 
22 Ibid.: 11. 
23 Frank C Carlucci, "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense,"  (Department of Defense, 
1988), 13. 
24 Ibid., 6. 
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numbers of newer models of tanks such as the Leopard II, Abrams, and Challenger.25 
This is not to say that the Warsaw Pact was standing still during this period. In fact the 
Pact’s combat capability dramatically improved due to deployment of the T-72 and new 
tactical aircraft.26 By the late 1980s NATO had finally reached a position that might be 
described as conventional parity. This creates an opportunity to meaningfully study the 
potential for conventional conflict in Central Europe as NATO would no longer have to 
immediately resort to nuclear weapons. Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev began a 
significant withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe in December of 1987. The 
weather of Central Europe as well as standard military doctrine calls for operations to 
commence in the late spring or early summer. In order to give the Warsaw Pact the best 
possible opportunity the conflict will be set in the summer of 1987. The advantage of 
picking a single season to analyze a potential conflict is that specific information can be 
gathered about each side’s relative capabilities instead of using ranges. The analysis will 
look at 11 different factors and then draw a conclusion about the probable outcome of 
                                                 
25 Malcolm Chambers and Lutz Unterseher, "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact 
Tank Fleets," International Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988): 12. 
26 Hans Gunter Brauch and Robert Kennedy, eds., Alternative Conventional Defense Postures in the 
European Theater 2vols., vol. 1: Military Balance and Domestic Constraints (New York: Taylor & 
Francis, 1990), 49. 
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the invasion. The factors examined will be: reliability of military allies, the non-nuclear 
argument, Warsaw Pact strategy, NATO strategy, action on Europe’s flanks, naval 
operations, aerial operations, ground forces, mobilization and reinforcement, readiness, 








RELIABILITY OF MILITARY ALLIES 
 
 The first important question when examining a military alliance must be the 
reliability of the alliance members in a conflict situation. While including a nation’s 
military resources in a tally of an alliance’s capabilities can comfort that alliance’s other 
members, this is a dangerous exercise if serious concerns exist about that nation’s 
commitment to the alliance. The difficulty in determining a nation’s military reliability is 
that often the commitment to an alliance is dependent on the scenario and conditions 
under which commitment will be called for. Conclusions about an alliance’s conflict 
cohesion must follow from an examination of the historical involvement of each nation 
in the alliance as well as current attitudes and trends in national thought. 
NATO and Reliability 
 NATO’s nature contributed to the reliability of its members in a fundamental 
manner. Each member of NATO maintained a member of its own will and volition and 
could leave the alliance when and if it decided to. Therefore NATO members felt that 
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their involvement in the alliance benefited their national interests and security concerns. 
As an alliance of sovereign states NATO was not always able to make decisions as 
quickly as efficiently as the Warsaw Pact but never needed to concern itself with 
coercing its members to support NATO action. Certainly some members of NATO were 
greater supporters of the alliance than others but the difference was in degrees of 
commitment, not question of commitment. Generally West Germany was the staunchest 
supporter of NATO for obvious geographic reasons.27 On the end of the spectrum was 
Norway, Denmark, and especially France. Norway and Denmark balanced their support 
for NATO with a desire to keep Cold War tensions at a minimum with the result of 
appearing less than fully committed to NATO at times. While both Norway and 
Denmark refused to allow the stationing of foreign troops on their soil, they made 
extensive arrangements to rapidly reinforce their national ground, air, and sea forces 
with formations and units from other NATO nations in a crisis. The stalwart 
participation of Norway and Denmark in NATO exercises also serves to confirm their 
commitment to NATO. For NATO the real question was France. 
                                                 
27 Ronald D. Asmus, "West German NATO Policy: The Next Five Years,"  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1989), 18. 
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 France was one of the founding members of NATO in 1949 and served as one of 
the occupying Allied powers in Germany after the Second World War. Over the next 
two decades France grew concerned about the influence that the United States and the 
United Kingdom wielded in NATO by virtue of their combined economic and military 
power. The result was the withdrawal of French forces from NATO’s military command 
structure in President De Gaulle in 1968. France ordered the removal of NATO units 
from its soil but remained a part of the alliance’s civilian component. After this France 
sought to develop an independent voice in European affairs as well as the military power 
to back up this voice. France began to deploy its own nuclear deterrent force 
independent of US nuclear capabilities, the Force de frappe or “striking force”. However 
by the 1980s France seems to have understood the vital role that it could play in a 
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.28 The French government began to state that it could not 
guarantee is national security apart from cooperation with other European nations.29 
Under President Mitterrand France began moving closer to NATO in terms of 
                                                 
28 Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization (Washington, DC: The National Defense 
University Press, 1988), 281-82. 
29 "The French Are Ready to Cross the Rhine," The Economist July 13, 1985, 43. 
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cooperation and military policy.30 The French 1st Army was reorganized in 1985 into 
three mechanized corps well deployed to support NATO. Also in 1985 the French 
Defense Minister stated that France had “plans to send units of its new Rapid Action 
Force into West Germany at the first hint of hostilities in Europe.”31 France’s 
commitment to support the FRG was clearly stated on several occasions.32 One of the 
most telling indicators of French attitudes was the fact that the Soviets assumed that 
France would join with NATO in the event of conflict.33 Given French military 
deployments and public policy it seems clear that France would have wholeheartedly 
supported NATO if attacked by the Warsaw Pact. 
The Warsaw Pact and Reliability 
 The issue of ally reliability for the Warsaw Pact was much more complex than 
for NATO. The Soviet Union clearly understood that its presence in Eastern Europe was 
                                                 
30 Peter Wilson and Kevin Lewis, "A Follow-on Strategic Echelon for NATO,"  (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 1985), 20. 
31 "The French Are Ready to Cross the Rhine," 43. 
32 Simon, ed., NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization, 310, James A. Thomson, "An Unfavorable 
Situation: NATO and the Conventional Balance,"  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, November 
1988), 11, John Stokes, "Threat Assessment,"  (Paris, France: Assembly of the Western European Union, 
November 1986), 190. 
33 Flynn, ed., Soviet Military Doctrine and Western Policy, 257. 
 
 16
generally unpopular, as evidenced by the deployment of Soviet ground troops in an 
occupational pattern. In terms of military effectiveness the clear implication of this 
attitude was that Eastern European forces could not be assumed to participate in a Pact 
invasion without reason. In response the Soviets worked very hard to integrate the upper 
echelons of Eastern European militaries with their own. An Eastern European officer 
who desired a command position had to have attended a Soviet military school at some 
point.34 In 1980 the Soviets pushed a measure through the Warsaw Pact that gave them 
direct control of Eastern European military forces in an emergency situation.35 The 
effectiveness of these Soviets efforts needs to be examined on a national basis. 
 Romania provided the most blatant example of questionable commitment to the 
Warsaw Pact. Romanian policy towards the Warsaw Pact was characterized by three 
important decisions. No Warsaw Pact forces were permitted to be stationed or transit 
through Romanian territory. Romanian combat forces did not take part in Pact field 
exercises and were not sent outside of Romania. Romania consistently refused to 
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participate in the full Warsaw Pact military command structure.36 Romania was the only 
Pact nation to refuse to sign the 1980 statue giving the Soviet Union greater control over 
Pact forces.37 President Ceausescu openly opposed the Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 and refused to allow Romanian troops to be involved.38 He also repeatedly 
called for the Pact and NATO to disband as they were a threat to international peace.39 
While the condemnation of NATO is typical of Eastern European nations the comment 
on the Pact is very telling. Romania openly broke with the Pact on several other points, 
asking for assurances from the United States that Romanian territory would not be 
targeted in a strategic nuclear exchange.40 Romanian military doctrine is based on 
territorial defense, self-sufficiency and popular participation. Romania is the only Pact 
nation to develop an extensive militia, the 1 million strong Patriotic Guards.41 
Romania’s public posture, military posture and doctrine, as well as limitations on 
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participation in the Warsaw Pact lead to the conclusion that Romania would work very 
hard to not participate in a Soviet led invasion of Western Europe.42 
 For Czechoslovakia and the Warsaw Pact the most important event was the 
restoration of orthodox Communist rule in 1968. After the invasion the Soviets worked 
to rebuild the Czech military in order to bring the force back under Communist Party 
control. This period was characterized by “wide-ranging purges of the officer corps, an 
unprecedented voluntary exodus of junior officers, serious recruitment problems, low 
morale, and defiant anti-Soviet attitudes by Czechoslovak soldiers.”43 The result was a 
massive increase in under-qualified and undereducated candidates receiving officer’s 
commissions. Czechoslovakia was the only nation in the Warsaw Pact to maintain a 
Party militia, the People’s Militia, and this corps size unit was equipped with heavy 
weapons.44 This is a clear example of the Czech government’s attitude towards the 
Czech military. According to the Czech Communist Party the primary purpose of the 
Czech military was to protect national territory against a re-armed West Germany. When 
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Chancellor Willy Brandt began his Ostpolitik program of greater contact with Eastern 
Europe in the early 1970s the stated objective of the military seemed less realistic. All in 
all it seems that the part of the Czech military that was trained and equipped specifically 
for combat operations in conjunction with Soviet forces would have performed reliably. 
It was in these units that the best officers were stationed and they also were the most 
tightly integrated into the Soviet command structure. However it does not seem that the 
Soviets could have counted on reserve Czech formations to perform in any function 
other than internal security. The longer Czech forces were engaged in combat the more  
likely it would become that Czech reserve forces would cause problems with Pact lines 
of communication.45  
  
                                                 






THE NON-NUCLEAR ARGUMENT 
 
 An examination of Soviet strategic military doctrine and the situation in Europe 
demonstrates that by the 1980s the Soviet Union saw a non-nuclear conventional conflict 
in Europe not only as a potential plan but as a preferred operation. The Soviet attitude 
towards operations in Europe could be described as conventional preference while 
retaining a nuclear option. The Soviets arrived at this position due to the conditions 
under which they planned to use nuclear weapons, improvements in conventional 
technology, and the challenges resulting from the use of nuclear weapons. 
 In January 1977 at the city of Tula, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev 
declared that nuclear weapons were an instrument of theory and too horrible to be used 
as an instrument of policy. By the late 1970s Warsaw Pact war plans assumed that 
nuclear weapons would only be used in a response to a nuclear NATO first strike.46 
“None of the plans for the late 1970s and the 1980s speak of a first use of nuclear 
                                                 




weapons by the Warsaw Pact without relating it to NATO first use preparations.”47 
Soviet planners had a clear understanding of NATO’s doctrine of Forward Defense, 
under which nuclear weapons would be used if Soviet forces defeated NATO on the 
conventional battlefield.48 They assumed that a future war would start with conventional 
weapons, that NATO would then be defeated on the battlefield, and that in response 
NATO would launch its tactical and theater nuclear weapons.49 At the same time the 
Soviets understood that a pre-emptive nuclear strike would not be able to prevent NATO 
from retaliating in kind.50 Therefore the utility of a nuclear war as a means to change the 
strategic balance in the Soviet Union’s favor was reduced. The Soviets intended to detect 
NATO’s preparations for its first strike and then to launch their own weapons just as 
NATO’s were launched.51 “Great care was taken not to proceed to a nuclearization of a 
conflict unless the enemy was about to do so; pre-emption and ‘meeting strikes’ would 
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have been seen as a reactive, not an active step towards escalation.”52 Pact forces were 
to look for three signs that NATO was organizing a first strike: withdrawal of NATO 
troops from the front edge of battle, increased transmission of NATO warning signals, 
and decentralization of NATO troop concentrations to minimize the effect the Soviet 
nuclear response.53 This was referred to as a “launch on warning” strategy in the West 
and a “meeting strike” or “converging strike” strategy in the Soviet Union, similar to the 
manner in which US strategic nuclear forces were to be used.54 In an invasion of Central 
Europe if NATO was never forced to resort to nuclear weapons then there would be no 
reason, according to Soviet doctrine, for the employment of nuclear weapons by the 
Soviet Union. 
 Developments in technology towards the end of the Cold War made it possible 
for the Soviets to achieve their objectives in a nuclear strike situation without using 
nuclear weapons. In a nuclear situation in Europe Soviet objectives were to attack 
NATO’s nuclear forces and the associated nuclear command, control, and 
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communication systems in order to limit NATO’s ability to use its own nuclear 
weapons.55 In the early 1980s Soviet writers and military leaders began to describe new 
precision guided munitions as having the same characteristics and capabilities as tactical 
and theater nuclear weapons.56 Advances in Soviet aircraft and weapon design enabled 
the Soviets to destroy their nuclear strike targets without utilizing nuclear weapons.57 
The Chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1977 to 1984, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov 
stated that  
 “Rapid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction… 
make many types of weapons global and make it possible to sharply increase (by at least 
an order of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional weapons, bring them 
closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness. The sharply 
increased range of conventional weapons makes it possible to immediately extend active 
combat operations not just to the border regions, but to the whole country’s territory, 
which was not possible in past wars.”58  
 The similarities in destructive power and range of conventional weapons and 
nuclear weapons were clear to the Soviets.59 For the Soviets the substitution of precision 
guided conventional munitions for nuclear weapons would provide them with several 
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advantages. Precision guided munitions avoid the political complications of using 
nuclear weapons, do not radioactively contaminate the target area which might threaten 
friendly troops, and do not require the use of multiple weapons to ensure destruction of 
the target.60 The Soviets began to see their conventional forces as capable of achieving 
their objectives apart from a nuclear strike.61 Soviet plans began to call for NATO’s 
nuclear capability to be targeted by Soviet tactical aircraft or seized by airborne and 
heliborne troops.62 The Soviets recognized that there were benefits to using conventional 
weapons when these weapons were just as capable of accomplishing their goals as 
nuclear weapons. 
 Soviet military planners were well aware of the difficulties of operating large 
mechanized formations on the nuclear battlefield. These planners understood that the 
economic strength of Western Europe was far more valuable to the Soviet Union if it 
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was not damaged by an exchange of nuclear weapons.63 The Soviet military became 
more aware “that the use of nuclear weaponry would slow down rather than speed up 
Warsaw Pact military advances to the shores of the North Atlantic.”64 While the Soviets 
could not control NATO’s decision to use nuclear weapons, they could take steps to 
minimize the potential for nuclear release on their side. Much of the Soviet conventional 
buildup in the 1970s was aimed at developing a conventional capability that could defeat 
NATO without the need to use nuclear weapons from the start.65 Around 1970 the 
Soviets began to plan for commencing operations in Europe with conventional forces 
only.66 However Soviet plans stressed that their forces were not to operate in a manner 
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that left them vulnerable to nuclear attack.67 In a conventional operation Soviet forces 
were not to concentrate more than necessary in order to minimize the damage that a 
NATO nuclear strike might cause. In this way the Soviet concern for remaining prepared 
for nuclear operations would have affected the deployment of Soviet conventional 
forces. The consequence of this Soviet line of thought would also have been important in 
the positioning of Soviet naval forces. Given that Soviet planning called for the use of 
nuclear weapons in response to a NATO nuclear strike, that conventional weapons were 
seen as capable of achieving the objectives of a Soviet nuclear strike, and the difficulties 
in operating on a nuclear battlefield, it seems clear that a Soviet invasion of Western 
Europe in the summer of 1987 would have commenced with the use of only 
conventional weapons. Soviet forces would have operated in a manner that would limit 
NATO’s ability to launch a damaging nuclear first strike but would not have escalated 
the conflict to a nuclear level unless NATO did.  
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WARSAW PACT STRATEGY 
 
 It is important to have an understanding of the several different levels on which 
Warsaw Pact ‘strategy’ would have guided an invasion of Western Europe. As a 
technical term, ‘strategy’ referred to the highest level of military planning and thought. 
Operational art referred to “the practice of generals – or their staff colonels – for 
achieving operational success.”68 This involved campaign plans and practices on the 
level of divisions, corps, and armies. Tactics were the domain of regiments and 
battalions and dealt with fire and maneuver on the field of battle in order to defeat the 
enemy. Military doctrine can be defined as the “fundamental principles by which 
military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national 
objectives.”69 The Soviet military gave priority to two national objectives: “the 
achievement of radically favorable shift in the strategic nuclear relationship” and “the 
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ability to surround or defeat opposing ground forces…within the various theaters of the 
Eurasian landmass, plus the ability to exploit those successes by investing and occupying 
the desired territory.”70 The second objective was primarily concerned with an invasion 
of Western Europe. Soviet strategy, operational art, and tactics were designed and 
formulated in order to achieve these objectives.71 The Soviet preference for commencing 
combat operations with only conventional weapons while retaining a nuclear strike 
capability has already been shown and it is under this assumption that the analysis of 
Soviet military planning and theory will proceed. 
 An important initial consideration is the conditions or situation that would cause 
the Soviet Union to decide to launch this invasion of Western Europe. Any number of 
potential situations could bring this about and the specific situation is not as important as 
the Soviet attitude. A degradation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, a political crisis 
with China, or a power struggle in another region with the US could all bring the Soviet 
leadership to see NATO as an imminent threat to Soviet national security.72 The Soviets 
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generally saw NATO not only as a threat to Soviet interests but to the security of the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.73 However a crisis situation would have been needed 
for the Soviets to decide that NATO needed to be eliminated as a powerful presence on 
the European continent.  
 The Soviet Union clearly recognized its inferior position in terms of economics 
and population and planned accordingly. In 1985 the Warsaw Pact’s combined 
population stood at 386.4 million and total Gross National Product (GNP) was 2.728 
billion dollars.74 At the same time NATO included 515.6 million people with a total 
GNP of 6.089 billion dollars. Therefore any Soviet attack on Western Europe needed to 
result in a speedy conclusion. If NATO was given the opportunity to deploy and utilize 
its much greater economic potential and manpower then the Soviet Union could never 
hope to successfully defeat NATO. An overriding concern for Soviet military planning 
was the need to quickly defeat NATO. Additionally the Soviets were very concerned 
that the Chinese might try and take advantage of a war between NATO and the Warsaw 
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Pact.75 A speedy resolution to this war would allow the Soviets to transfer forces to the 
Far East to deter any Chinese ambitions. 
The best way to bring an invasion of Western Europe to a speedy conclusion was 
to take the offensive. Soviet military doctrine declared that “the offensive is the main 
type of combat”76 and “the strategy, operational art, and tactics of its [the Soviet Union] 
military forces and their magnitude, structure, and disposition all suggest a clear 
offensive character.”77 The offensive would be carried out by massing forces to break 
through the enemy’s front line and then “advance swiftly into the depth of his [the 
enemy’s] defense and move into operational space”78 The “operational space” refers to 
the area behind the enemy’s front line where deep strategic penetrations can occur. In 
order to achieve this break through force ratios on the main axis of attack were to be 
around 4:1 or 5:1.79 These ratios were to be reached by concentrating forces on a small 
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number of breakthrough sectors. The Soviets planned to insert Operational Maneuver 
Groups (OMGs) into the enemy’s rear in order to seize strategic objectives. An OMG 
would consist be a reinforced tank or motor rifle division 80, “a combined-arms concept 
of armor, assault helicopters, self-propelled artillery, rocket launchers, and mobile air 
defense.”81 These units were to be committed to combat within the first two days apart 
from the second echelon of Soviet troops.82 
The specific operational plan regarding the nature of a Soviet invasion of 
Western Europe deserves consideration. The invasion would have been conducted under 
the auspices and command of the Western Theater of Military Operations.83 The Soviet 
envisioned the use of 5 Fronts84: Jutland, Coastal, Central, Luxembourg, and Bavarian.85 
The Jutland Front would have consisted of primarily East German troops, 3 divisions, 
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advancing into Schleswig-Holstein through the Kiel Canal.86 This Front was also 
responsible for taking the Danish island of Bornholm and launching amphibious and 
airborne operations against Zealand, northern Denmark.87 The Coastal Front was follow 
the Jutland Front and attack 4-5 days after the initial invasion.88 Polish troops made up 
the Coastal front, 4 divisions, which was to turn west south of Hamburg to take West 
German’s northern ports. The Central Front with Soviet forces would have attacked 
through the North German Plain along the line Braunschweig-Hannover-Bielefeld-
Hamm heading towards the northern Ruhr and then Aache, Maastricht, and Liege.89 The 
Luxembourg Front, also with Soviet troops, began in Thuringia and was to attack 
through the Fulda Gap, heading for the Rhone north of Frankfurt towards Reims and 
Metz. The Bavarian Front of 4 Czech divisions and Soviet forces were to pass through 
Bavaria and then Baden Wurttemburg towards France.90 The Czechs were to form the 
initial assault group with the Soviet Central Group of Forces on Czechoslovakia used as 
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a reserve or an OMG.91 Soviet plans did not anticipate the violation of Austrian 
neutrality.92 The Soviet objective was to reach the French border after 13-15 days of 
combat, establish 2 new fronts, and continue the attack through France, reaching the 
Spanish border by day 30 or 35.93 An East German force of 3 divisions was tasked with 
taking West Berlin while Eastern European troops garrisoned West Germany.94 
According to Warsaw Pact planning documents “the goal of the operation is to liberate 
the territories of the GDR and CSSR, to occupy the economically important regions of 
the FRG east of the Rhine, and to create the right circumstances for a transition to a 
general offensive aimed at bringing about the withdrawal of the European NATO states 
from the war.”95 All of these forces would be controlled through the Soviet command  
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Figure 1 Soviet Invasion Plan96 
 
 
structure as the Warsaw Pact did not have a military command system.97 Figure 1 shows 
a diagram of the Soviet invasion plan. Warsaw Pact forces would have conducted these 
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attacks in accordance with clear operational and tactical procedures. Divisions would be 
committed to combat and then replaced when the entire unit is exhausted and incapable 
of combat operations.98 The attack would begin with offensive probes using motor rifle 
regiments reinforced with armor.99 These units would have sought out “weak points, 
non-fortified areas, flanks or boundaries between major units.”100 Once these areas had 
been identified then armor heavy formations such as tank regiments and tank divisions 
would have been moved forward.101 If presented with a sold line of prepared positions 
then attacks would be made by dismounted motor rifle regiments.102 This would allow 
the infantry to suppress anti-tank missile defenses on foot. Attacks would be preceded by 
heavy concentrations of artillery fire designed to further suppress NATO’s anti-tank 
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defenses.103 The assignment of reinforcements and support units would be dependent on 
which division or regiment had made the most progress.104 Each attacking regiment was 
to attack on roughly a 10 kilometer front.105 Airborne troops were to be dropped on 
important crossing points such as roads, bridges, and canals to aid the advance of the 
main body.106 Urban combat was to be avoided where possible but if inevitable then the 
city or town would be attacked by a frontal assault designed to bypass pockets of 
resistance.107 This frontal assault would have been similar to the ‘Thunder Run’ that US 
armored forces launched through Baghdad in March 2003. 
Soviet adherence to the stated plan of action was a salient feature of their military 
planning. The commander would specify the plan of attack including the exact thrust 
lines that each unit would follow and the time within which each objective was to be 
reached.108 Subordinate commanders were required to follow the plan precisely without 
deviation. “The underlying thought is that with the requisite forethought, staff work, and 
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in-depth planning, the attacking force can scientifically ordain the success of the 
operation before the first units cross the start line.”109 This type of military thinking 
limited the displays of initiative which was crucial to the success of a maneuver based 
breakthrough operations.110 To achieve a breakthrough commanders needed to be able to 
move their reserves as opportunities for penetration presented themselves. The Soviet 
centralized command and control system would have sought in vain to pre-plan where 
these opportunities would occur.111 Reserves and fire support assets were not to be 
deployed at a local commander’s discretion but as a part of the overall operational 
plan.112 The senior leadership of the Soviet military recognized the need for initiative on 
the part of their junior officers but their efforts were “stifled at an intermediate level and 
by the military education system.”113 Additionally the Soviet desire for secrecy and 
compartmentalization would have limited the ability of junior officers to take advantage 
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of an opportunity on the ground even if these officers had been prepared to do so. 
Subordinate commanders were generally given information that only dealt with their 
area of responsibility.114 One of the clearest examples of the Soviet desire for secrecy 
occurred at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks The Soviet military representatives not 
to discuss detailed information about Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities and equipment 
in front of the Soviet Foreign Ministry civilians on the Soviet delegation because they 
were not cleared for that information.115 This institutional insistence upon limited 
dissemination of material would have posed challenges for the Soviet ability to conduct 
a successful breakthrough operation. 
Soviet military planners not only withheld vital information from their 
subordinates but deliberately deceived them as to the nature and capabilities of NATO 
forces. In all of the Warsaw Pact exercises it was assumed that NATO launched an 
attack on Eastern Europe and that Warsaw Pact forces were initially on the defensive. 
However these defensive operations did not receive training time or resources. Only the 
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mobilization and counterattack portions of these exercises were practiced.116 Given that 
these exercises were offensive in nature it is clear that “self-deception was integral to 
Soviet planning”117 Warsaw Pact planning documents never mentioned NATO’s 
extensive efforts in developing a series of defensive positions as this would counter the 
Pact’s official position that NATO was an offensive alliance. Only a very few senior 
officers were aware of the existence of these defenses. These planners also arbitrarily 
increased the size of NATO forces in their intelligence reports, by doubling the size of 
the West German army for example, in order to justify the official position.118 This 
attitude of self-deception would have been only counter-productive in a combat 
situation. 
The Soviet emphasis on political indoctrination also limited their ability to focus 
on military matters. According to Soviet doctrine the most important indicators of 
combat readiness were “a correct understanding by commanders, staff, and political 
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organs of their missions” and the “highly moral-political state of the troops.”119 Combat 
capabilities were seen as dependent on the level of political fervor in soldiers and the 
greater the dedication to the Communist Party the greater the efficiency of a formation. 
Without enough resolution and determination a Soviet unit could accomplish any 
objective. The end of the 1970s in particular saw a relapse into a Stalinist focus on 
Marxist doctrine and ideological purity in Soviet military planning as opposed to 
military professionalism.120  
In terms of surprise Soviet priorities lay in limiting the time that NATO would 
have to deploy its troops to combat positions. The Soviets sought tactical, not 
operational or strategic surprise, as this would enable them to hide the place, weight, and 
specific timing of their attacks while giving them time to reinforce their forward 
positions.121 The Soviet maskirovka (‘deception plan’) would have tried to prevent 
NATO from mobilizing for as long as possible by covering the Warsaw Pact’s 
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mobilization.122 On the whole Soviet plans were designed to bring about a rapid defeat 
of NATO through the use of breakthrough operations. However problems such as 
unnecessary secrecy, self-deception, lack of initiative, and over-centralization would 
have hindered Warsaw Pact forces as they sought to carry out these plans. While Soviet 
operational art and doctrine were sound, institutional challenges in the Soviet system 
would have worked against the successful execution of a high speed deep penetration 
operation. 
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 NATO doctrine was certainly not as homogenous as Warsaw Pact doctrine due to 
the greater voice that each member of NATO had in the military decision making 
process. NATO members agreed on the broad strategic strokes describing how their 
militaries’ would fight and even some similar operational concepts. At the same time 
national militaries were free to define their own operational and tactical doctrines within 
the NATO framework. NATO’s two strategic objectives were deterrence and defense. 
NATO’s “military posture is based on the principle that the member countries must 
collectively maintain adequate defense to deter aggression, and should deterrence fail, to 
preserve their territorial integrity.”123 NATO’s two strategic doctrines were Flexible 
Response and Forward Defense. Flexible Response involved military forces “sufficient 
to deter aggression, and should deterrence fail, be capable of direct defense, including 
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escalation under political control, to the level of response necessary to convince the 
aggressor of the defender’s determination and ability to resist, thus persuading him to 
cease the attack and withdraw.”124 NATO would deploy forces to deter an attack, use 
those forces to defend NATO territory against the attacker, and utilize nuclear weapons 
if a conventional defense was not enough to protect the NATO member.125 The 
introduction of nuclear weapons would begin on a tactical and theater level but NATO’s 
ultimate guarantee of deterrence was the US strategic nuclear arsenal which was to be 
used against the Soviet Union as the final step in Flexible Response. The principle of 
Forward Defense or Vorneverteidigung to its West German authors “means a defensive 
posture in which the defensive battle commences at the border and yields no territory 
without a fight.”126 For the West Germans participation in NATO was contingent upon 
the defense of their entire territory. The West German government clearly stated that 
“because of the lack of depth, the high population density, and heavy industrialization, 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, there is no military operational alternative to 
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immediate initiation of a cohesive defense close to the border.”127 Over a fourth of West 
Germany’s population and industrial capacity lay within 100 kilometers of the Inner 
German Border (IGB).128 Therefore there was no question of falling back across West 
Germany in order to wear down and spread out Warsaw Pact attackers. This position had 
implications for NATO’s view of defensive fortifications. West German leaders were 
adamantly opposed to the construction of fixed fortifications because this seemed to be 
implicitly abandoning that part of West Germany between the IGB and the 
fortifications.129 NATO’s member states developed their national military doctrines 
within the framework of Flexible Response and Forward Defense. 
 An understanding of NATO’s command structure will be helpful in examining 
NATO’s military doctrine. During the Cold War there were three NATO supreme 
commands: Allied Command Europe (ACE) under the command of the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) under the 
command of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), and Allied 
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Command Channel (ACCHAN) under the Commander in Chief Channel (CINCHAN). 
ACE was divided into Allied Forces North, Center, and South (AFNORTH, AFCENT, 
and AFSOUTH). AFNORTH was responsible for Norway and Denmark while 
AFSOUTH defended the Mediterranean. The most important region was AFCENT 
which dealt with Central Europe. AFCENT was divided into the Northern Army Group 
(NORTHAG) and the Central Army Group (CENTAG). From north to south 
NORTHAG controlled I Netherlands, I West German, I British, and I Belgian Corps. 
Likewise CENTAG had III West German, V US, VII US, and II West German Corps.130 
The deployment of the NATO corps is shown in Figure 2. 
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 There were several areas in which NATO was able to build common operational 
doctrine. For example NORTHAG agreed in 1986 to concentrate its armor reserves for 
counterattacks rather than spreading them out throughout the front line.132 NATO 
developed plans to move forces from one army group or corps sector to another to 
reinforce threatened portions of the line.133 The concept of Follow On Forces Attack 
(FOFA) was adopted by NATO in the early 1980s. FOFA called for NATO to strike, 
primarily using tactical aircraft and attack helicopters, reinforcing Warsaw Pact units 
and their associated transportation systems.134 Early in a conflict NATO forces would 
focus on disrupting Warsaw Pact forces through attacks on command and control 
facilities and electronic warfare.135 NATO forces also agreed upon a minimum threshold 
of defending forces that they would work towards. Each NATO brigade was to hold 
about between 7-15 kilometers of the front line depending on the terrain in the area.136  
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The NATO armies generally invested more personnel and resources in command and 
control structures in order to keep the maximum number of brigades in combat at a time. 
The fact that NATO was faced with a defensive operation also contributed to common 
practices. NATO units would have sought to deploy in covered areas that prevented 
attacking forces from seeing them. This also would give NATO forces the first shot in 
any particular engagement. 
In terms of military doctrine NATO militaries started with different building 
blocks. West Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands used the brigade as the lowest 
independent combat formation while the US, UK, and France used the division.137 This 
difference as well as national military structures resulted in varying views as to the use 
of combat formations in a defensive setting. For example French divisions, which were 
smaller than other NATO nations, were trained to conduct highly mobile, shock oriented 
counter attack operations.138 The United States’ AirLand Battle will be examined later 
but suffice it to say that AirLand served to make corps level of decision making as 
important as the divisional level.139 German and Dutch doctrine called for the use of 
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maneuver to reinforce threatened sectors and counterattack an attacker’s flanks. German 
forces operated according to the concept of Auftragstaktik, “mission orders”, in which 
subordinate commanders were given their objectives and then allowed the freedom to act 
as they saw fit.140 German officers were trained to respond to circumstances without 
direction from higher headquarters.141 Belgian forces were trained to conduct a more set-
piece stubborn defense where reserves were fed into battle to reinforce units under 
attack.142  
British military doctrine was an interesting blend of fire and maneuver 
components. Their operational tactics, called Framework Defense are described as 
follows:  
"The infantry will entrench, creating fields of fire between a network of strong points. It will 
deploy its anti-tank weapons so as to be able both to attack oncoming vehicles and also to allow them to 
pass engage them from the rear. The British will enfilade and attack from the flank. A screen of light 
reconnaissance tanks will identify the main direction of the enemy thrusts; other British tanks will hold the 
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open ground between the anti-tank networks and one of the three armored divisions will be kept in 
reserve."143 
Two of the British armored divisions would use this positional defense schema 
while the other armored division would be kept in reserve. Another infantry division 
would be used for rear area security and deep reserve.144 British tactics could be 
described as a ‘sponge defense’ designed to slowly soak the momentum and strength 
from an enemy attack. 
During the 1970s the United States Army operated under a doctrine known as 
Active Defense. Active Defense focused on the strategic constraints of fighting 
outnumbered, forward defense, and the imperative of winning the first battle through the 
concentration of firepower at the Schwerpunkt, the point of maximum enemy effort.145 
Once the Schwerpunkt was identified then US battalions would be shifted to maximize 
the fire brought to bear on the enemy.146 The Army realized that while these tactics 
                                                 
143 Hew Strachan, "Conventional Defense in Europe," International Affairs 61, no. 1 (Winter 1984/1985): 
30-31. 
144 Faringdon, Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Superpowers, 364-65. 
145 Saul Bronfeld, "Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army," 
Journal of Military History 71, no. 2 (April 2007): 483. 
146 Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982, 6-9. 
 
 51
would provide for the defeat of the first echelon of Warsaw Pact forces there would be 
several more waves of divisions that would attack later. As a result of this understanding 
as well as the Israeli experience in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 the Army developed 
AirLand Battle.147 AirLand Battle called for the use of superior US firepower, 
technology, maneuverability148, and initiative to defeat a Soviet attack at the point of 
contact as well as in the enemy’s rear. US officers were trained in the German model of 
Auftragstaktik so as to be able to take advantage of holes in Soviet formations that would 
appear in the chaos and disruption of the modern battlefield.149 AirLand was a “blend of 
classical Soviet maneuver theory with… attrition-oriented… American warfighting 
doctrine”150 AirLand sought to take advantage of Soviet tactical rigidity, wave attack 
style, and technology inferiority. A key part of this was the interdiction of Warsaw Pact 
forces through the use of tactical airstrikes and long range artillery attacks. These forces 
could be targeted because of the deployment in 1986 of the JSTARS151 aircraft that was 
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equipped with long range ground surveillance radar.152 AirLand Battle would have 
enabled US forces to get the maximum result from their strengths while targeting Soviet 
weaknesses. 
In examining NATO’s doctrine perhaps the greatest advantage of the Alliance 
was that its forces were fighting on the defensive over terrain they practiced and trained 
on regularly. Historically the defense enjoyed a 3:1 advantage over the attack, all things 
being equal.153 While this ratio provides no guarantees for any defender it does highlight 
the advantage of the defense. Whereas the attacker must move out and expose his forces 
in order to take ground and find the defender, the defender can utilize concealment and 
pre-positioning to catch the attack unaware and out of position. NATO’s members 
sought to utilize as much of the terrain in West Germany as possible for their operations 
and all had a clear understanding, if not interpretation, of the need for defensive tactics 
to be responsive to enemy thrusts and not a simple linear schema.  
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 While the decisive theater of operations in a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western 
Europe the course of events on Europe’s flanks could have had an influence on the 
outcome of combat in Central Europe. Europe’s flanks were generally the areas covered 
by NATO’s AFNORTH and AFSOUTH commands, primarily Norway, the 
Mediterranean, northern Italy, and European Turkey. For example if the Soviet Union 
would have been able to neutralize or occupy the airfields in northern and central 
Norway then the deployment of Soviet naval vessels into the Atlantic would be eased. If 
NATO had been able to hold onto northern Norway then the establishment of naval 
superiority in the Norwegian Sea would have been eased. The most probable outcome of 
events associated with an invasion of Western Europe in the summer of 1987 will be 
determined through an abbreviated campaign analysis.154 
 
                                                 




 Soviet plans called for a dual invasion of northern Norway through overland 
operations and a seaborne amphibious operation under the command of the 
Northwestern Theater of Military Operations.155 The Soviet objective was to neutralize 
or occupy the NATO airfields, especially at Bodo, that would have supported aircraft 
patrolling submarine barriers and assisting the advance of NATO carrier battle 
groups.156 Control of these airfields would have allowed the Soviets to place their own 
aircraft there which could then be used to degrade NATO’s control of the Norwegian 
and North Seas. NATO would have sought to protect Norway’s territorial integrity and 
ensure NATO control of the northern Norwegian airfields. The Soviets would have had a 
naval infantry brigade for use in the amphibious operation and two motor rifle divisions 
kept at a high state of readiness on the Kola Peninsula. There were a further 6 motor rifle 
divisions further south near Leningrad that would have been available for 30 days of 
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mobilization.157 The Norwegians could have had over 5 brigades of troops in northern 
Norway within several days of mobilization, supported by a brigade of UK-Dutch 
Commandos, the two brigade sized Allied Mobile Force, and a US Marine Amphibious 
Brigade.158 All in all NATO would have had around 9 brigades of forces to defend 
northern Norway with in a conflict situation. Northern Norway was a mountainous area 
dominated by treeless high plateaus divided by long, narrow lakes that extend inland 
from the fjords. Only one road runs from north to south in northern Norway which 
would have channeled attacking forces. The melting snow and permafrost make 
movement of large forces very difficult in the summer and the length of the fjords create 
natural chokepoints.159 The Soviet amphibious force could only launch operations as an 
outflanking maneuver and could not take and hold territory unreinforced.160 This unit 
most probably would have been contained wherever it landed on the north Norwegian 
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coast. Soviet plans did not call for a violation of Swedish neutrality as this would upset 
the already perilous balance of forces in the north.161 Given the excellent defensive 
terrain and the reinforcements that Norway and other NATO nations could have brought 
to bear it does not seem that the Soviets would have been able to occupy the airfields in 
northern Norway. The 7 Soviet brigades in the area would have had a hard time making 
progress against the 9 NATO brigades. 
The Mediterranean 
 The Mediterranean theater consisted of three separate operations: an invasion of 
northern Italy, naval combat in the Mediterranean Sea, and an invasion of European 
Turkey. An examination of the situation in Turkey will aid in the analysis of the other 
two operations. Warsaw Pact objectives in European Turkey were the capture of the 
Dardanelles in order to allow the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to reinforce the squadron the 
Soviets kept in the Mediterranean. Given that Romania would have sought to be 
excluded from any Warsaw Pact offensive operation and would not have allowed Soviet 
troops to cross their territory, the options for the Warsaw Pact would have been limited. 
Bulgaria would have had to carry the assault with minimal assistance from Soviet 
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ground forces. Bulgaria’s small army would have taken time to become combat ready 
and even then was outnumbered by Greek and Turkish forces.162 Given these 
discrepancies it seems clear that NATO would have been able to hold onto the 
Dardanelles. This would have ensured that NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean 
would have faced only the small Soviet squadron kept there. NATO’s maritime strength 
in that region significantly outmatched the Soviet squadron and NATO’s naval forces 
would have prevailed with some losses.163 The balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact 
forces available for use in northern Italy would have provided neither side with a clear 
advantage.164 Warsaw Pact units would have had to cross through Yugoslavia to reach 
northern Italy, giving Italian commanders plenty of warning time. Italian strategy was 
well suited to delaying Pact forces in the mountainous terrain that dominates northern 
Italy. The terrain formed natural chokepoints and defensive barriers that Italian forces 
planned to utilize.165 Italian forces would have enjoyed air support from NATO naval 
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units as well as from land based aircraft. Given the forces that both sides could have 
brought to bear and the excellent defensive terrain of Northern Italy it seems that 
Warsaw Pact forces would not have made significant progress, if any. 
Conclusion 
 Overall it seems that NATO had taken sufficient measures to ensure the security 
of its flanks. In both locales NATO’s superiority in naval forces would have served to 
aid the Alliance’s defensive operations. Warsaw Pact forces would have been sufficient 
to tie down the NATO forces assigned to the flanks and could have drawn in the 
reinforcements earmarked for those areas. This would have prevented NATO from 
transferring some of its forces from the flanks to the center, which certainly would have 
served the Pact’s objectives. In the north NATO deployed primarily light infantry and 
naval forces that would have served to aid the battle for the Central Front even if they 
had been available. In the south geographic barriers prevented NATO from reinforcing 
the Central Front from Italy, Turkey, or Greece. All in all it seems that the battles for the 
flanks would have gone in NATO’s favor, though units in these regions would have not 







NAVAL FORCES AND OPERATIONS 
 
 
 Maritime considerations would have played a critical role in any Warsaw Pact-
NATO confrontation due to the inherent flexibility and capacity of sea power. In order to 
determine the effect of sea power on a Soviet invasion of Western Europe the naval 
objectives and priorities of each alliance must be established. Then the forces available 
for each alliance must be considered along with their capabilities. Finally a look at 
operational plans will allow conclusions to be drawn about the relative ability of each 
side to accomplish its naval objectives. 
Maritime Roles 
 For the Soviet Union the 1980s saw the culmination of a period of naval 
expansion and modernization under the leadership of Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, 
who served as Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy from 1956-1985166. Gorshkov 
was instrumental in transforming the Soviet Navy from a coastal defense force with 
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limited deep water abilities to an ocean going fleet with ships on deployment all around 
the world. Soviet naval thinking viewed Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)167 
as their most important naval asset due to the more secure nuclear capability these ships 
provided. Given the Soviet insistence on preparing for and retaining nuclear capabilities 
even in a conventional combat scenario, SSBNs were a critical part of Soviet strategic 
doctrine. While ICBMs168 and bombers could be targeted by American missiles and 
aircraft wholesale, it would be much more difficult for a large portion of the Soviet 
SSBNs to be destroyed in a short period of time. Ensuring the security of these ships so 
that they could perform “counter-value action against the shore”169 was the primary role 
of Soviet naval forces. In a nuclear war situation these SSBNs would have acted as the 
ultimate deterrent against a US first strike. They would have survived such a strike and 
been able target American cities with their missiles. Here again we see the Soviet 
fixation on the potential for nuclear combat affecting the deployment and usage of 
conventional forces. In terms of affecting the ground war in Central Europe the most 
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effective use of Soviet naval forces was attacking NATO SLOCs but Soviet doctrine 
dictated that the Soviet Union be prepared at all times for a nuclear conflict with the 
result that Soviet naval forces were kept far to the north of NATO’s shipping lanes. 
 According to Soviet writings Soviet naval forces would have had several wartime 
missions and goals during a conventional war in Europe. The Soviet wartime naval 
missions, in order of importance, were: strategic nuclear strike, destruction of enemy 
naval forces, support for ground force operations, interdiction of enemy sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs)170, and protection of Soviet SLOCs.171 The first mission would 
have been accomplished through creating bastions where Soviet SSBNs would deploy 
and then defending these bastions from NATO antisubmarine (ASW)172 units such as 
nuclear attack submarines (SSN)173 and carrier battle groups (CVBG)174. Destruction of 
enemy naval forces involved specific attacks on NATO SSBNs and NATO carriers in 
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order to achieve a favorable change in the strategic nuclear balance.175 Ground force 
support meant the landing of amphibious troops on enemy shorelines and the interdiction 
of NATO amphibious assaults. NATO SLOCs would be targeted through attacks on 
ships at sea, air strikes on port terminals, and the mining of NATO ports.176 Soviet 
SLOCs would be secured by protecting Soviet territorial waters. The wartime 
deployment of Soviet maritime forces was designed to aid the ground offensive through 
the accomplishment of these objectives. 
 Soviet naval doctrine was “fundamentally defensive and territorial”.177 
“Fundamental to Soviet naval strategy is the concept of area defense based on two 
zones: an inner one, where superiority of force would allow local command of the sea to 
be secured, and an outer zone, where command would be actively contested.”178 The 
outer zone included the Norwegian, North, and Eastern Mediterranean Seas while the 
inner zone comprised the Black, Baltic, and Barents Seas. The Baltic Fleet, Black Sea 
Fleet, and 5th Eskadra were focused on supporting ground force operations and 
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preventing NATO offensive naval operations.179 The primary provinces of the Northern 
Fleet were SSBN bastion defense, attacks on NATO SSBNs and carriers, and SLOC 
interdiction. In general Soviet naval priorities reflect those of a continental land power 
and not a maritime nation.  
 While Soviet naval missions were primarily focused on sea denial and support of 
ground operations, NATO’s naval forces were dedicated to securing and retaining 
command of the seas.180 NATO’s wartime naval missions were, in order of importance: 
defend Europe’s flanks, protect NATO SLOCs, neutralize Soviet SSBNs, and maintain 
maritime supremacy in the North Atlantic.181 The defense of Europe’s flanks involved 
protecting Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom in the north and 
preventing the Soviet Black Sea Fleet from entering the Mediterranean in the south.182 
NATO needed to be able to move troops primarily from North America to Europe and 
the ships and port facilities involved in this transfer were to be defended from Soviet 
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attack. Soviet SSBNs in their bastions would have come under attack by NATO ASW 
forces, particularly submarines. Maritime supremacy in the North Atlantic was to be 
ensured through hunting down any Soviet naval units in the area and then preventing 
further Soviet maritime forces from gaining access. 
 The US Maritime Strategy was an important component of NATO naval strategy 
and will therefore be examined in some depth. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the US 
Navy had very specific intelligence about Soviet naval war planning and Soviet 
perceptions of US naval strategy.183 The Soviet reliance on their SSBNs in a nuclear war 
situation and the corresponding develop of a defensive bastion system was well 
understood by US intelligence and the CIA recommended that the US Navy develop a 
method of operation that would challenge this reliance.184 In response to this intelligence 
and understanding of Soviet naval strategy the Maritime Strategy was developed under 
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman.  
The Navy defined the Maritime Strategy by saying “options are available for 
early, offensive action to destroy enemy maritime forces as far forward as possible, 
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aggressively protect sea lines of communication, support and influence land battles, and 
secure favorable war termination.”185 The Maritime Strategy called for three types of 
operations to be conducted in the event of a conventional war with the Soviets. US and 
NATO SSNs were to move into the Norwegian and Barents seas to attack Soviet 
submarines. US submarine launched cruise missiles and carrier tactical aircraft would 
attack Soviet fleet units and the network of Soviet naval facilities on the Kola Peninsula. 
US CVBGs were to defend Norway from Soviet invasion. The Maritime Strategy was to 
take place in conjunction with the more traditional barrier defense and convoy escort 
strategies.186 Barrier defense called for NATO to deploy patrol aircraft, surface ships, 
and submarines along two ‘gaps’ to interdict the movement of Soviet submarines. Those 
two gaps are the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap and the North Cape Gap between 
Svalbard Island and northern Norway. According to CINCLANT187, Admiral Lee 
Baggett Jr., the first priority for the Maritime Strategy was control of the Norwegian Sea 
as this would “be essential for the containment of the Soviet Northern Fleet and for 
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power projection on NATO’s northern flank.”188 The Maritime Strategy broke from 
previous US doctrine in several ways, particularly its offensive flavor, but also in that it 
did not call for the transfer of units, particularly carriers and their escorts, from the US 
Pacific Fleet (3rd Fleet) to the Atlantic Fleet (2nd Fleet).189 The execution of the Maritime 
Strategy would see the movement of US CVBGs and SSNs into the Norwegian and 
Barents Sea near the start of a conventional war. On the whole the Maritime Strategy 
sought to give NATO the strategic initiative at sea by forcing the Soviets to respond to 
NATO operations. 
Soviet Maritime Forces 
 Soviet naval forces had been built up to an impressive size by 1987 given the 
limited ability of the Soviet Navy to project power earlier in the Cold War. Soviet forces 
were divided into four fleets that were each focused on different areas. The Northern 
Fleet operated out of a series of shipyards and docks on the Kola Peninsula centered on 
Murmansk. The Northern Fleet was primarily responsible for operations in the Barents 
and Norwegian Seas and the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. The Northern Fleet was the 
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largest of all the Soviet fleets and contained large numbers of submarines, surface 
combatants, patrol and strike aircraft, and patrol ships. The Baltic Fleet was based at 
Kaliningrad and focused on the Baltic and North Seas. The Baltic Fleet consisted 
primarily of smaller surface combatants, amphibious transports, fast attack craft, and 
older submarines. These units were to assist in taking control of the Baltic Sea and 
launching amphibious operations to capture Denmark and the exits from the Baltic Sea. 
The Black Sea Fleet operated out of Sevastopol and kept ships, the 5th Eskadra 
(Squadron), deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. The Pacific Fleet was based at 
Vladivostok and was concerned with the Pacific Ocean. Table 1 shows the deployment 
of Soviet naval forces in the summer of 1987 according to fleet. Some Warsaw Pact 
members also maintained small navies and these units would have been controlled by 
one of the Soviet fleets in wartime. The naval strength of the Warsaw Pact members is 






















SSBN 37       
SSB 2   6   6 
SSN 50  6     
SSGN 30       
SSG 8 1  3   3 
SS 45 30 6 30   30 
CVN        
CV 1 1      
CVH        
BB        
CHG  2      
CGN 1       
CG 9 7 1 7   7 
DDG 18 14 2 9   9 
DD 4 10 2 4   4 
FFG 8 7 1 6   6 
FF 40 45 2 30 3 1 34 
FA 20 35  50 59 14 123 
MCM 60 90  130 46 30 206 
LRMP 80       
MP        
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With an understanding of geographic Soviet naval strength one can look into the 
specific roles that naval units would have been utilized in based on design and mission 
priority. The defense of SSBN bastions, the first priority for the Soviet Navy, would 
primarily require the destruction of NATO SSNs as they posed the greatest threat to 
Soviet SSBNs. The Soviet emphasis on anti-submarine operations is clearly 
demonstrated in that almost every Soviet surface ship to enter service after 1966 has 
been classified as an antisubmarine unit.194 Bastion defense would take up a significant 
percentage of the Soviets major surface combatants (CGN, CG, DDG, DD, & FFG) as 
well as Soviet SSNs and SSs.195 Many of the Soviet surface ships were designed to 
operate in small groups in the inner anti-submarine defense zones, the bastions.196 The 
Delta and Typhoon class SSBNs that were to be defended would have deployed into far 
northern waters relatively near the Kola Peninsula where they could be covered by land 
based patrol aircraft.197 Other Soviet submarines would be deployed in defensive lines in 
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the North Sea to engage NATO naval forces, especially approaching US CVBGs.198 
Soviet exercises in 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1985 rehearsed attacks on NATO 
surface ships and submarines heading north into the Barents and Norwegian Seas as a 
part of defending the SSBN bastions.199 Overall Soviet SSBN bastion defense operations 
would have consumed a large percentage of the Soviet navy’s resources. 
The next priority for the Soviet Navy was the destruction of US CVBGs that 
could threaten the SSBN bastions, Soviet naval units, or the bases on the Kola Peninsula. 
These carriers were also seen as threatening because their aircraft could carry nuclear 
weapons and US plans called for these aircraft to be deployed near the Soviet Union. 
Soviet plans were based around attacks on US carriers but their plans could easily have 
been used against other NATO carriers (three British, three French, and one Italian). The 
Soviets sought to counter Western carriers in two different types on scenarios: 
continuous company and close encounter. Continuous company refers to the situation in 
the Eastern Mediterranean where the carriers of the US 6th Fleet were always shadowed 
by a Soviet ship, usually a destroyer, and would be attacked by Soviet cruise missile 
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submarines. These SSGNs would receive their targeting data from the shadowing ship 
and would launch their weapons in the very first hours of a war with NATO. The close 
encounter variant, which would occur in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea, 
involved the detection of NATO carriers in the outer zone by Soviet reconnaissance 
aircraft and then synchronized missile attacks on these carriers by long range maritime 
strike aircraft and SSGNs.200 These attacks would seek to overload the multiple layers of 
defenses that a US CVBG utilized.201 It is clear that by the 1980s the primary 
conventional attack force of the Soviet Navy was land based aircraft, Backfire and 
Badger bombers and Bear reconnaissance aircraft, and cruise missile submarines.202 
These aircraft would have attacked in groups of 20-30 and sought to coordinate their 
attacks with submarines.203 Surface ships were seen as too vulnerable to NATO attack, 
especially air attack, given the extensive capabilities and experience of US carrier 
aircraft in anti-ship operations. The Soviets practiced redeploying their Backfire and 
Badger maritime strike aircraft from the Pacific to the Atlantic in order to concentrate 
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their efforts on a particular US CVBG and maintained extensive stocks of long range 
anti-ship missiles for use by these aircraft.204 
In terms of the ground combat in Central Europe the most important mission for 
the Soviet Navy should have been the interdiction of NATO’s North Atlantic SLOCs as 
NATO depended on the arrival of reinforcements and material from North America to 
successfully defend Western Europe. However analysts in the 1980s concluded that 
“there is little evidence from recent writings of the Soviets- or from observation of their 
recent maneuvers for that matter- to support the thesis that they plan to conduct an 
extensive campaign against Western sea lines of communication (SLOCs) during a 
major war with the United States.”205 In fact the Soviets seemed more interested 
attacking NATO SLOCs not to reduce NATO’s wartime reinforcement capability but in 
order to divert NATO ASW units. The Soviets understood that the assignment of a 
relatively few number of their forces to anti-SLOC missions would result in a 
disproportionately larger deployment of NATO ASW units to protect those SLOCs. 206 
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Additionally the Maritime Strategy forced the Soviets to allocate more of their resources 
to defending their SSBNs now that NATO planned to specifically target those units.207 
The Soviets did not have many major naval units to use against NATO’s SLOCs after 
they satisfied their SSBN defense and anti-carrier requirements. The Soviets only had 29 
relatively quiet SSNs for use and many of these would have been used in operations not 
targeted on NATO SLOCs. 208 
Soviet writings and exercises demonstrate a preference for attacking European 
receiving ports rather than interdicting SLOCs on the high seas.209 Soviet long range 
aircraft and submarines could attack port terminals or mine ports. Around 30 Soviet 
submarines, mostly older models, would have been assigned to attack NATO SLOCs in 
addition to whatever maritime aircraft could be spared from attacking NATO carriers.210 
These older diesel submarines were not well suited for operations against SLOCs 
because of their need to ‘snorkel’ to recharge their batteries, low top speed, and their 
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vulnerability when recharging their batteries. 211 In order to reach NATO’s European 
ports Soviet submarines would have had to travel at least 2200 nautical miles and if they 
were to attack NATO convoys the distance would be greater.212 The point is not these 
submarines could not have physically completed the trip, which they could have, but that 
most of the water they would be traveling through would be patrolled by NATO ASW 
ships, submarines, and patrol aircraft. This passage in and of itself would have been 
extremely hazardous in wartime, and the Soviets would not have wanted to deploy large 
numbers of their submarines into the North Atlantic before NATO had been alerted.213  
Soviet operations to secure their own SLOCs and to support amphibious 
operations would have been carried out by the vast numbers of small frigates and fast 
attack craft that they deployed. These units could not take part in operations on the high 
seas due to design limitations but were more than sufficient to secure Soviet territorial 
waters and to protect coastal shipping. Amphibious operations in the Baltic would have 
been carried out in a series of landings as previously described, protected by land based 
aircraft as well as the Soviet Baltic Fleet supplemented by the national navies of East 
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Germany and Poland. The Soviets would have sought to secure the 3 exits from the 
Baltic by sweeping the minefields that NATO would have deployed to cover those exits 
and destroying NATO maritime forces in the Baltic. 214 The Soviets had naval infantry 
forces stationed in the Baltic and the Kola Peninsula for use by the Baltic and Northern 
Fleets, respectively.  
Soviet ships suffered from a number of maladies that would have limited their 
long term effectiveness in a naval conflict with NATO. In general Soviet naval 
procurement focused on “a numerical increase in the force strength of the fleet, naval 
aviation and coastal forces, while everything else- the system of basing, infrastructure, 
rear services-were left for the future.215 The result of this policy was the neglect of 
regular repairs on older ships and the resulting need for early retirement due to a lack of 
maintenance. The shipbuilding industry focused solely on the construction of new ships 
and not the upkeep of older ships. The Soviet Navy was responsible for using its 
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“generally limited and ineffective repair capabilities”216 to conduct what maintenance 
operations it could. The following quote is illustrative of Soviet priorities: 
“For each ruble allocated for shipbuilding, only 12 kopecks were spent on 
developing a system of basing.[1 ruble = 100 kopecks] In contrast, for each dollar 
allocated for shipbuilding in the US, three dollars were spent on developing systems of 
shore-based support.”217 
 Soviet ship design also limited the long term effectiveness of Soviet vessels. In 
terms of submarines Soviet submarines were, as a rule, louder than comparable NATO 
submarines.218 The primary method of detecting a submarine is by listening for the 
sounds that the engines make, whether nuclear or battery powered, with passive sonar 
equipment. A submarine’s noise level is measured not only when it is sitting still but a 
various speeds. As the submarine increases speed its engine plant must work harder to 
turn the propellers and this makes more noise. NATO’s noise cancelling technology was 
better than the Soviet’s and the Soviets themselves acknowledge the “relative 
invulnerability” 219 of NATO submarines due to this technological edge. The Soviets 
also had difficulty developing fire control and search radar systems that could track large 
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numbers of targets at one time and provide guidance to more than one missile.220 This 
limited the number of targets that a Soviet ship could engage at one time. While Soviet 
ships often looked impressive because of the large number of missile launchers on their 
decks, these launchers often only a few, if any, missile reloads.221 On a one to one basis 
Soviet ships were less capable than their NATO counterparts and were designed for 
short, intense, individual operations.222 Training focused on the ability to operate alone, 
not in task forces as was NATO’s preference.223 This was useful for defending wide 
areas of the Barents Sea against NATO submarines but much less effective in facing off 
against groups of NATO warships. 
NATO Maritime Forces 
 NATO’s naval strength was divided among three primary commands. 
SACLANT224 controlled the Atlantic and operations in the north while CINCCHAN225 
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oversaw the English Channel. The Mediterranean was the domain of AFSOUTH226 who 
ultimately reported to SACEUR. NATO’s naval strength was large and varied due to the 
diverse nature of the navies that contributed to it. On one end of the scale the Danish and 
Greek navies could only defend their coastal waters and on the other end the US Navy 
could project power anywhere in the world in a matter of days. Many of the smaller 
NATO navies decided to specialize in a specific type of maritime operations while the 
larger US, UK, and French fleets maintained the capability to perform the full range of 
naval missions. The Belgians worked towards mine clearance capabilities to ensure the 
availability of European ports for reinforcement convoys from North America.227 
France, Spain, and the Netherlands also deployed effective mine countermeasure forces, 
in keeping with their potential role in keeping NATO’s SLOCs open.228 The West 
Germans and the Danes cooperated in building large numbers of fast attack craft, smaller  
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Table 2 NATO Naval Deployments I229 
Naval 
Unit 





SSBN    6    
SSB        
SSN     3   
SSGN        
SSG        
SS  3 4 12 3 10 9 
CVN        
CV     2   
CVH    1   2 
BB        
CHG        
CGN        
CG     1  2 
DDG  4  5 3  4 
DD    5 4 14  
FFG 4  5   2 12 
FF  8 5 11 6 2 4 
FA   16   22 8 
MCM 29  13 22 7 14  
LRMP  18 13  5  18 
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Table 3 NATO Naval Deployments II 
Naval 
Unit 







SSBN    4 28   
SSB        
SSN    15 56 4  
SSGN     7   
SSG        
SS 5 13 16 14 1  24 
CVN     3   
CV     4 1  
CVH    3    
CHG        
BB     2   
CGN     3 2  
CG     12   
DDG    13 20 2 3 
DD   14  17  4 
FFG 8   33 30 3 6 
FF 10 5 7 2 27 2 3 
FA  46 20    40 
MCM 21 8 26    57 
LRMP 13 7  28 170   
MP       19 
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submarines, and land based naval aircraft to control the Baltic. The Norwegians 
developed sea control abilities for use in the Norwegian Sea in conjunction with US 
carrier and amphibious forces.232 Table 2 and Table 3 show the breakdown of NATO 
naval forces according to nationality and deployment area in some cases. 
The NATO navies would have been deployed according a more national pattern 
than their Soviet counterparts. Aside from the US, UK, and French fleets each NATO 
navy would have been generally responsible for the defense of the waters surrounding 
their national territory. This is not to say that they would be used individually. On the 
contrary NATO naval units had a high degree of cooperative training and 
interoperability in tactical doctrine and communication.233 In the north NATO 
operations would have been centered around attacking Soviet naval units in the 
Norwegian and Barents Seas, ensuring the reinforcement of Norway by NATO ground 
forces transported by sea, preventing Soviet submarines from entering the North 
Atlantic, and striking Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula as a part of the Maritime 
Strategy. Early on in a conflict, US and NATO SSNs would have penetrated the Barents 
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Sea to attack Soviet SSBN bastions.234 In the 1980s concern was expressed that these 
offensive submarine operations might have escalated a conventional conflict to the 
strategic nuclear level. This does not seem likely at all given the large size of the Soviet 
SSBN force and the limited number of SSBN warheads needed to make a dramatic 
impact in a counter-value strike.235 Even if NATO SSNs and ASW forces could have 
successfully targeted several Soviet SSBNs they would require months to hunt down 
enough of these ships in order to prevent the Soviets from attacking NATO cities with 
their SLBMs.236 European navies generally envisioned their navies chipping away at the 
Northern Fleet until US CVBGs passed through the GIUK Gap to commence large scale 
offensive operations.237 NATO reinforcements earmarked for Norway such as the ACE 
Mobile Force, the CAST, and the US MAB would need to be escorted through the North 
and Norwegian Seas with surface combatants and covered by land based patrol and 
strike aircraft. In addition NATO rehearsed amphibious operations with US, UK, and 
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Dutch marines in northern Norway to turn the flank of a Soviet land advance south into 
Norway.238  
While all of NATO’s ships were not deployed at sea at all times, they regularly 
practiced ‘surging’ to sea in a crisis situation. For example around a third of the US fleet 
was at sea at any given time but the bulk of the remainder could be available for duty in 
short order.239 The US had 60 SSNs tasked for operations in the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean and 80% of them would have been available for immediate deployment 
on the day that a mobilization order was announced.240 Given the assumption of 10 days 
mobilization time the vast majority of NATO naval forces would be available for 
operations. This issue of ‘surging’ is particularly important in considering the scope and 
nature of US CVBG operations in a conflict. The US 2nd Fleet trained for operations 
involving 2 Battle Forces with 2 aircraft carriers in each Battle Force in addition to 
roughly 6 escorts per carrier.241 In addition a battleship Surface Action Group (SAG)242 
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and 3 Underway Replenishment Groups (URGs)243 would have been deployed to the 
North Atlantic.244 By the time combat started on M+14 the US would have had almost 
completed moving these forces into the North Atlantic where they would be ready to 
penetrate the GIUK Gap. Each US carrier held a powerful striking force of tactical 
aircraft totaling 80-90 planes per carrier.245 As these carriers moved in to secure the 
Norwegian Sea NATO SSNs would have worked to ‘sanitize’ the ocean directly in the 
carrier’s line of passage and would have launched cruise missile strikes on Soviet bases 
on the Kola Peninsula.246 Overall the US would have been able to deploy and operate its 
carriers in this scenario in a manner consistent with its training and doctrine; that is as a 
united striking force supported by NATO maritime forces. 
Given that as these carriers moved into the Norwegian Sea they would have 
come under Soviet missile attack primarily from cruise missiles and maritime attack 
aircraft it is worth examining the capabilities of a US CVBG in defending against such 
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an attack. A battle group was defended by a series of layers of firepower that would be 
applied to incoming missiles and aircraft.247 Furthest out F-14 Tomcat fighters would 
use their long range Phoenix missiles to engage threats detected by the battle group’s 
radar and the E-2C Hawkeye radar surveillance planes. They would be backed up by 
F/A-18 Hornet fighters with Sea Sparrow missiles, long range Standard Surface to Air 
Missiles (SAMs) fired by the battle group’s escorts, short range Sea Sparrow SAMs, and 
finally short range automated Phalanx Gatling guns. This layering of different platforms 
with different capabilities ensured that US forces would be given several opportunities to 
‘knock down’ incoming Soviet missiles. Even with all this defensive firepower it is 
possible that in a synchronized attack a small number of Soviet missiles would have 
gotten past the battle group’s defenses. It was often assumed that one or two cruise 
missile hits would put a carrier out of action. However the US Navy’s historical 
experience does not support this perspective. On three separate instances since World 
War II a major explosion has occurred on a US aircraft carrier but the carrier has been 
able to resume flight operations within hours of the attack if needed. In one of these 
explosions, on the USS Forrestal on July 29, 1967 off South Vietnam, “nine large 
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bombs explode on the flight deck, the equivalent of a half dozen conventionally-armed 
cruise missiles.”248 The physical size of a US aircraft carrier as well as its large crew 
would have made it very difficult to put such a platform out of action. “Advances in 
damage control, area air defense, sustainability, and maneuverability- the latter two 
attributes conferred by nuclear propulsion- render the modern attack carrier of the of the 
two most survivable surface men-o’-war presently afloat [The other being the US Iowa 
class battleships].”249 It seems that US carrier battle groups would have been able to 
hold their own against Soviet attacks in the Norwegian Sea, inflicting severe damage on 
Soviet naval forces in the area.250 In any case the deployment of NATO naval units on 
offensive operations would have served to keep Soviet fleet units defending their SSBN 
bastions and not attacking NATO SLOCs.251 
In terms of the ground war in Central Europe the most important NATO naval 
operation was the protection of SLOCs from North America to European ports. It was 
through these ports that critical US reinforcements would pass as they were transported 
                                                 
248 Francis J West et al., Naval Forces and Western Security (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's 
International Defense Publishers, 1987), 17. 
249 Ibid., 18. 
250 Nitze and Sullivan, Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options, 401. 
251 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks. 
 
 87
to West Germany. We will later assess the ability of the US specifically to prepare 
combat formations in the US for transport to Europe and the specific size and type of 
these reinforcements. For now it is sufficient to examine the ability of NATO’s naval 
forces to protect these formations as they were shipped across the Atlantic. Ultimately 
both capabilities are necessary in order for reinforcement to occur. On any given month 
1500 ships unload their cargoes in European ports just to keep pace with normal 
peacetime economic activity.252 A total of 325 shiploads per month would have been 
needed to transport all of NATO’s initial reinforcements and supplies.253 The first 
inherent difficulty for the Soviets was to differentiate between the ships carrying NATO 
military cargos and the ships carrying civilian cargos. While the Soviet task would have 
been simplified by the fact that NATO military cargo bearing ships would have travelled 
in defended convoys there would have been a large amount of background traffic 
passing through the North Atlantic at the same time.  Only ships carrying military cargo 
would have been organized into convoys. 254 NATO planning called for convoys made 
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up of 60 transport ships and 7-8 escorts sailing at 15 knots.255 These convoys would 
have been protected continuously by maritime patrol aircraft operating from based in 
North America, Bermuda, Iceland, the Azores, and the UK during their crossing. As a 
historical comparison in World War II only 1% of Allied shipping losses occurred in 
convoys that had surface and air escorts.256 These mobile escorts would have been 
supplemented by constant patrols in the waters surrounding ports in the US and Europe 
to counter Soviet mines and submarines.257 “Given the very large throughput capacities 
of NATO ports demonstrated in peacetime and the relatively small amount of military 
cargo that had to be delivered the Soviet port destruction campaign would have to have 
been very effective to stop NATO’s reinforcements.”258Additionally NATO would have 
roughly 215 million tons of shipping to call on at the start of a conflict.259 These vast 
reservoirs of shipping meant that the Soviets would not be able significantly affect 
NATO’s overall carrying capacity. All in all NATO was is in a good position to provide 
a secure crossing for reinforcements coming from the US.  
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An important NATO asset in countering Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic 
and Norwegian Seas was the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), a series of passive 
sonar arrays deployed to allow NATO to locate Soviet submarines at long range. SOSUS 
provided worldwide coverage and was able to localize the position of a Soviet submarine 
to within 10km from hundreds of miles away.260 One series of SOSUS arrays was 
deployed between Bear Island and Norway and another along the GIUK Gap.261 
Additionally in the 1980s the US Navy constructed several small SURTASS262 ships 
that would have provided SOSUS-like coverage for the mid-ocean areas where SOSUS 
coverage did not extend.263 Between SOSUS and SURTASS NATO would have had a 
rather accurate picture of Soviet submarine activity and been able to focus the efforts of 
its ASW forces. 
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 When reaching conclusions regarding naval operations in a NATO-Warsaw Pact 
conflict in the summer of 1987 the important thing to keep in mind is the impact that 
these operations would have had on the land battle in Central Europe. One side or the 
other could win complete command of the sea but if their land forces were defeated then 
this victory would seem rather hollow. Given the balance of naval forces in the Baltic 
each side would have inflicted serious losses on the other in that area. However NATO 
does not seem to have the ability interdict Soviet amphibious operations against 
Denmark given the short distance that these forces would have to cover. NATO also 
does not seem to have had the forces or doctrine necessary to successfully challenge 
Soviet control of their territorial waters. The offensive action of NATO CVBGs and 
SSNs against Soviet naval units in the Norwegian Sea outer defense area and Soviet 
SSBN bastions in the Barents Sea is a fascinating and intricate topic. However the result 
of these attacks is less important than the fact that this operation would have kept more 
Soviet maritime power focused on destroying NATO’s carriers than attacking NATO’s 
SLOCs. It seems clear that NATO would have been largely successful in destroying 
 
 91
Soviet surface vessels within its aerial and undersea striking reach early in a conflict.264 
This would have been the case in part due to NATO’s numerical superiority in terms of 
major warships and the design limitations of Soviet vessels. larger percentage of the year 
deployed at sea. Attacks on Soviet SSBN bastions after the initial days of a conflict 
would have resulted in serious losses on both sides. However given the diversion of 
Soviet maritime power due to the priority of SSBN defense and the need to counter 
offensive efforts by NATO carriers and submarines it seems that only a relatively small 
number of older Soviet submarines would have been deployed against NATO Atlantic 
SLOCs. Given the historical experience of convoys defended with air and surface units, 
the numerical and qualitative balance of forces deployed to attack and protect NATO’s 
reinforcement convoys, and the US Navy’s capability for locating Soviet submarines on 
the high seas it seems that NATO’s sealift of reinforcements would have been largely 
successful. While there certainly would have been losses it seems that in general the 
transport of combat formations and supplies from primarily US Gulf Coast Ports to 
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receiving ports in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands would not have been 
significantly affected by Soviet maritime forces. 
 
Table 4 shows the comparative balance of naval forces available to each side in specific 
areas of operation. Additionally NATO ships were often more technically advanced in 
terms of the equipment they carried and spent a larger percentage of the year deployed at 
sea.265 Attacks on Soviet SSBN bastions after the initial days of a conflict would have 
resulted in serious losses on both sides. However given the diversion of Soviet maritime 
power due to the priority of SSBN defense and the need to counter offensive efforts by 
NATO carriers and submarines it seems that only a relatively small number of older 
Soviet submarines would have been deployed against NATO Atlantic SLOCs.266 Given 
the historical experience of convoys defended with air and surface units, the numerical 
and qualitative balance of forces deployed to attack and protect NATO’s reinforcement 
convoys, and the US Navy’s capability for locating Soviet submarines on the high seas it 
seems that NATO’s sealift of reinforcements would have been largely successful. While 
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there certainly would have been losses it seems that in general the transport of combat 
formations and supplies from primarily US Gulf Coast Ports267 to receiving ports in 
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands would not have been significantly affected by 
Soviet maritime forces. 
 





















SSBN 38 37     
SSB  2  6   
SSN 71 50   7 6/6 
SSGN 7 30     
SSG  8  3  0/1 
SS 43 45 33 30 38 6/36 
CVN 3      
CV 4 1   3 0/1 
CVH 4    2  
CHG      0/2 
BB 2      
                                                 
267 West et al., Naval Forces and Western Security, 26. 
268 Canada, French Atlantic Fleet, Norway, UK, and US Atlantic Fleet 
269 Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, and West Germany 
270 French Mediterranean Fleet, Greece, Italy, Turkey, and US Mediterranean Fleet 
271 Number before slash indicates totals for 5th Eskadra only, number after slash indicates 5th Eskadra plus 
Soviet Black Sea Fleet 
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CGN 3 1   2  
CG 12 9  7 3 1/8 
DDG 42 18 3 9 9 2/16 
DD 22 4 4 4 32 2/12 
FFG 63 8 27 6 17 1/8 
FF 53 40 18 34 21 2/47 
FA 46 20 56 123 50 0/35 
MCM 30 60 120 206 47 0/90 
LRMP 223 80 26  23  







THE WAR IN THE AIR 
 
 In terms of conventional operations perhaps the most dramatic change in warfare 
in the 20th century was the role of airpower. Aircraft and weapons developed by leaps 
and bounds throughout the century, providing ever greater capabilities at every greater 
cost. By the 1980s NATO and the Warsaw Pact both had large numbers of high 
performance aircraft as well as a wide variety of support planes and bases in place in 
Europe. In a conflict between the two alliance systems the outcome of aerial operations 
would have had a significant influence on the course of the ground campaign. In order to 
determine the most probable outcome of the war in the air the organization, doctrine, 
strength, and quality of each alliance’s aerial forces will be examined as well as the 
effect of weather. 
Organization 
 The Warsaw Pact’s air forces were divided along national and geographic lines. 
The Eastern European air forces were all based on their own territory and would have 
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reported directly to Soviet commanders in wartime. The Soviet Air Force was in reality 
two different organizations, the Air Force (VVS) and Air Defense Troops (PVO). The 
VVS was responsible for the standard air force missions while PVO, the premier armed 
air force,272 concerned itself with strategic air defense. The Air Force was divided into 
Long-Range Aviation Command, Frontal Aviation Command, Military Transport 
Command, and Reserve and Cadre Training Command. Frontal Aviation held most of 
the tactical aircraft and would have been the primary combatant in a conflict with 
NATO. Aircraft from Frontal Aviation were assigned to Air Armies in the USSR and 
Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe. A regiment was considered the basic 
building block and each of these included three squadrons of aircraft, with 12-18 aircraft 
per squadron. Three regiments composed a division and two or more division made up 
an Air Army. The Soviet Frontal Aviation aircraft in Eastern Europe were the under 
direct control of Air Force High Command. Eastern European air defense aircraft were 
linked in with the Soviet PVO air defense systems under the direct control of Moscow. 
Airpower has historically been best utilized when operating under a centralized 
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command and control system and here the Soviets would have benefited from the 
centralization inherent in their governmental structure. 
 NATO’s air forces along the Central Front were divided into two units, the 2nd 
Allied Tactical Air Force and the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, referred to as 2 ATAF 
and 4 ATAF. 2 ATAF contained Belgian, British, Dutch, German, and US units 
supporting NORTHAG while 4 ATAF had Canadian, German, and US units supporting 
CENTAG.273 These two air forces were under the command of Commander Allied Air 
Forces Central Europe (COMAAFCE) who reported to SACEUR. NATO had developed 
an integrated air defense system called the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment 
(NAGDE) comprising ground based search radars, SAM274 sites, interceptor aircraft, 
airborne radars and command posts, and communication systems to link the various 
elements.  The basic NATO building block for aerial units was the squadron with 12-18 
aircraft. Squadrons were sometimes grouped into wings with 3-4 squadrons. The air 
defense of France and the United Kingdom remained national affairs although these 
command structures were fully integrated into NAGDE.275  
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Doctrine and Tactics 
 In a war with NATO situation, Soviet doctrine was centered around three 
priorities: protecting the USSR from air attack, conventional or nuclear, targeting 
NATO’s nuclear systems, and supporting the ground offensive. Overall Soviet military 
policy called for the waging of conventional war while retaining a capability to fight a 
nuclear conflict. For PVO air defense forces this meant the defense of  “ammunition 
dumps, nuclear storage sites, petroleum stocks, air bases, strategic early warning radars, 
and…some intermediate and long range nuclear offensive forces”276 located in the 
western USSR. Given that the primary role of the PVO was to defend against the US 
strategic bomber force in a nuclear attack setting, the Soviets would have sought to 
preserve this defensive capability. The best way to preserve the integrity of their 
strategic defense was to withhold those aircraft from participation in operations against 
NATO.277 Furthermore the aircraft assigned to strategic air defense were designed for 
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interception at high altitudes, not aerial combat.278 This would have been similar to the 
US policy of keeping some Air National Guard squadrons in the US for continental air 
defense. However the difference lies in the fact that PVO was a much larger force than 
US air defense forces. The result of the Soviet fixation on waging conventional combat 
with one eye always turned to the potential for nuclear war was that a large number of 
Soviet fighter aircraft would not have been deployed against NATO. 
 Frontal Aviation’s first objective was the elimination of NATO’s theater nuclear 
weapons, whether based on missiles or aircraft.279 The support of Warsaw Pact ground 
forces was a secondary mission, a fact recognized by the Soviets: “Neutralization of 
enemy weapon-carrying aircraft and missiles will constitute the main task, which will 
require a large number of aircraft. Therefore only limited air power can be assigned to 
support ground operations.”280 The elimination of NATO’s theater nuclear capability 
would be accomplished by focusing a high percentage of Frontal Aviation’s assets on 
those targets until they were destroyed. Frontal Aviation would have sought to create 
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‘safe’ corridors through NATO’s air defenses by suppressing air defense systems in 
order to allow strike aircraft to reach their targets. Priority would be given to nuclear 
weapons, storage sites, nuclear command and control structures, communication 
systems, and airfields holding nuclear capable aircraft.281 After these targets, especially 
the nuclear weapons and their storage sites had been destroyed then Frontal Aviation 
would have focused on supporting Warsaw Pact ground forces. However it seems that 
Frontal Aviation would have used up a large percentage of its aircraft and pilots during 
its offensive against NATO’s nuclear systems.282 This would have hindered its ability to 
provide support for friendly ground units. Frontal Aviation’s focus on NATO’s nuclear 
capability early in a conflict is another example of the Soviet insistence on preparation 
for nuclear combat negatively affecting conventional operations. 
NATO’s air forces did not suffer from the challenge of misguided assignment of 
its resources. NATO’s priorities were Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI)283, offensive 
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counter-air operations, air defense, and deep interdiction. However 2 ATAF and 4 ATAF 
took different approaches to the manner in which BAI was to be accomplished. 4 ATAF 
reflected US Air Force doctrine which called for attacks from medium to high altitude 
with large numbers of tanker, command and control, electronic warfare, SEAD284, and 
interceptor aircraft in support of the strike aircraft.285 2 ATAF was grounded more in 
European tactics which preferred the use of small packages of 2-4 strike aircraft at very 
high speed at very low altitude in order to take advantage of radar ground clutter and 
terrain contours to mask their approach.286 4 ATAF sought to apply massive firepower to 
targets near the front line clearly identified by higher headquarters and saw itself as 
“CINCENT’s central, strategic reserve to be shifted from sector to sector with great 
flexibility”287 The US Air Force wanted to spend as little time as possible in the Warsaw 
Pact air defense grid and sought to physically and electronically suppress these air 
defenses.288 European thinking wanted to attack targets of opportunity set 10-15 
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kilometers back from the front line as identified by the strike leader. US Air Force 
tactics were possible because of the greater American support assets. This is not to say 
that the two air forces would have operated with totally different methods. European 
aircrews were trained to operate with US aerial task forces and US strike aircraft 
regularly practiced attacks at low altitude along the European model. NATO had the 
technology to satisfy both styles of aerial warfare in all weather situations.289 
By the late 1980s NATO had developed two different types of aircraft that would 
have aided its efforts in the air war. In 1986 NATO’s 18 E-3 Sentry AWACS290 aircraft 
became operational in a multi-national squadron.291 These units had large airborne 
radars that provided greatly increased coverage and detection ranges while having the 
capability to coordinate the efforts of large numbers of aircraft. In a conflict situation 3 
of these aircraft would have been airborne at each time guiding and coordinating the 
efforts of the hundreds of NATO tactical aircraft operating at any given time. 
Historically AWACS aircraft have improved the efficiency and harmonization of aerial 
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efforts and it seems likely that NATO would have benefited significantly from these 
aircraft. In another vein in 1980 the US Strategic Command began to develop plans and 
procedures to use strategic heavy bombers in support of regional combat situations.292 
This involved giving around 75 B-52 aircraft the capability to use precision guided 
munitions such as smart bombs and ALCMs.293 Additionally B-52s were given the 
ability to drop large numbers of unguided munitions with great precision in any weather 
conditions.294 The long range cruise missiles could have targeted airfields and key 
transportation targets in Eastern Europe.295 Additionally the B-52s would have provided 
NATO the capability to rapidly inflict massive damage on specific Warsaw Pact 
formations through carpet bombing. The addition of these two large aircraft to NATO’s 
operational planning in the 1980s would have added to NATO’s ability to coordinate 
large numbers of aircraft and to deliver massive firepower on Pact ground units. 
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 The weather in Central Europe in the summers was generally conducive to air 
operations. The worst weather occurred in the winter although fog occasionally limited 
visibility in the mornings. The winds generally blew from east to west and rainstorms, 
generally closer to the coast, would have sometimes grounded certain types of aircraft on 
both sides. Table 5 shows the general visibility conditions in Europe and Germany from 
April to September. 
 
 
Table 5 Summer Weather in Germany296 
Ceiling/Visibility297 Percentages of  
Days in Europe 
Percentage of  
Days in Germany 
Under 1000 feet / Under 3 miles 10 10 
Around 1000 feet /   
Around 3 miles 
16 16 
Over 1000 feet / Over 3 miles 74 74 
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Table 5 shows that weather would not have hindered aerial operations in the summer 
months. NATO generally had a higher percentage of aircraft that were capable of 
operating in all weather conditions. Therefore NATO would have gained a small 
advantage in aerial operations due to the weather but not a significant one. 
Numerical Strength 
 While it is a common adage that victory does not always go to the side with 
larger forces, having more forces certainly does help. An examination of the numbers 
and type of aircraft as well as airfields and air defenses that NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
would have been able to utilize will aid in the analysis of the air war. In a conflict 
situation both the US and the USSR would have reinforced their forces in Central 
Europe with aircraft from their national territories. US plans called for the transfer of 
around 75 squadrons, roughly 1500 aircraft from the continental US to Europe.298 The 
US would have withheld 14 squadrons of interceptors for strategic air defense.299 The 
ability of the US to bring in these additional aircraft will be discussed later.  
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Table 6 NATO Aerial Strength300 
Nation Fighter301 Fighter/
Bomber
Attack302 Strike303 AWACS304 Bomber
Belgium  7/144     
Canada  3/54     
Denmark  4/66     
France 13/220 10/206     
Netherlands 1/18 7/128     
UK 2/48 8/162  7/148   
US 13/312 49/1080 26/504 11/260  4/80 
West 
Germany 
4/72 10/225  8/144   
Total 
NATO 
33/670 98/2052 26/504 26/552 1/18 4/80 
 
 
Table 6 shows the strength of NATO’s aerial forces in the Central Region after being 
reinforced by additional US aircraft. Table 7 shows the numbers and type of Warsaw 
Pact aerial forces that would be available after 14 days of Pact mobilization.  
                                                 
300 Cordesman, NATO's Central Region Forces, 77,102,25-27,52,83-84,93-95,213-14,40-41, Miller, The 
Cold War: A Military History, 30, Phil Williams, "British NATO Policy: The Next Five Years,"  (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990), 10, Philip Boshier, "NATO Combat Air Units,"  
http://orbat.com/site/history/index.html, IISS, The Military Balance, 1988-1989. 
301 A/B, A=Number of squadrons, B=Number of aircraft 
302 Short range tactical attack aircraft 
303 Long range, deep penetration, all weather strike aircraft 




Table 7 Warsaw Pact Aerial Strength305 
Nation Fighter306 Fighter/ 
Bomber 
Bomber 
Czechoslovakia 18/270 12/170  
East Germany 18/270 6/60  
Hungary 9/135   
Poland 33/400 18/225  
Soviet Union 78/1170 60/900 27/408 
Total  
Warsaw Pact 




These tables show that the Warsaw Pact head a clear lead in fighter aircraft which would 
have significantly aided their defensive efforts against NATO ground attack and strike 
aircraft. On the other NATO had a very large number of multi-role aircraft which gave 
the Alliance flexibility in determining its aerial tasking emphasis. The Warsaw Pact had 
a slight advantage in overall numbers but had less of a ‘swing’ capability between air 
defense and attack. NATO’s air defense aircraft would have been kept busy between the 
Pact’s large numbers of bombers and fighter-bombers. In terms of airfields and bases for 
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these massive numbers of aircraft NATO and the Warsaw Pact had roughly similar 
strengths, 220 airfields and 245 airfields respectively.307 Given the large number of 
airfields available for both sides basing would not have been a major problem for either 
side. The Warsaw Pact had an advantage in terms of numbers of air defense systems, 
having around 2000 SAM launchers as compared to NATO’s 1500.308 Warsaw Pact 
commanders understood that their air defense systems were not as technologically 
advanced as NATO’s so they deployed them in redundant overlapping patterns, as 
shown in Figure 3. NATO did make technological improvements in their air defense 
weaponry, radars, and communication systems during the 1980s.309 On the whole it does 
not seem that the outcome of aerial combat between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
would have been drastically affected by the numerical balance. Both sides had roughly 
                                                 
307 Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures, 249, Epstein, Measuring 
Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe, 198-99, Cordesman, NATO's Central Region Forces, 
76,158, Berman, Soviet Air Power in Transition, 41-42, Cordesman, "The NATO Central Front and the 
Balance of Uncertainty," 53. 
308 Cordesman, NATO's Central Region Forces, 24, Epstein, Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air 
Threat to Europe, 192, IISS, The Military Balance, 1988-1989. 
309 Cordesman, NATO's Central Region Forces, 160, Brauch and Kennedy, eds., Alternative Conventional 
Defense Postures in the European Theater 53. 
 
 109
equal numbers or aircraft and airfields. The Pact held an advantage  in number of air 









 In aerial combat qualitative factors are often more important than the quantitative 
balance. Historically qualitative factors have given Western air forces rather high kill 
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ratios.311 NATO’s aircraft were on average 8-10 years more advanced than Soviet 
aircraft and 13-15 years more advanced than Eastern European aircraft.312 Perhaps the 
most clear example of NATO’s technological edge was the development and 
deployment of the F-117 Nighthawk, a stealth strike aircraft, by the US Air Force in 
1981. The average NATO fighter-bomber had 3-5 times the payload carrying capacity of 
the average Warsaw Pact fighter-bomber and could carry that payload at longer 
ranges.313 Additionally NATO’s pilots went through more extensive and more realistic 
training than Pact pilots.314 While NATO pilots were trained to show initiative, Pact 
pilots were “dependent on ground-based command systems virtually throughout their 
entire flight.”315 This limited the ability of Pact pilots to respond to unexpected 
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situations. NATO’s challenge lay in a shortage of these highly trained pilots.316 NATO’s 
maintenance units were trained and equipped to get damaged aircraft back into action 
quickly by performing repair work at the local airfield level or an intermediate repair 
airbase located nearby.317Since forward maintenance personnel at Warsaw Pact airfields 
often suffered from shortages in replacement parts and equipment, damaged aircraft had 
to be sent back to rear area depots.318 This would have kept these aircraft out of action 
for long periods of time. All of these factors would have given NATO a qualitative edge 
in aerial operations.  
Conclusion 
NATO’s doctrine and tactics were clearly designed to make the maximum 
contribution to the ground campaign and to respond quickly to local commander’s 
requests for air support. The Warsaw Pact suffered from a doctrine that called for the 
targeting of NATO’s nuclear capabilities at the outset of a conflict. This would have tied 
up Pact aerial resources in operations that would not have materially affected ground 
operations and would have limited the Pact’s aerial resources when attention was finally 
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given to supporting Pact ground troops. Additionally the desire to preserve the Soviet air 
defense forces would have hindered the effectiveness of the Pact’s air defense efforts. 
The weather of Central Europe and the numerical balance would have given neither side 
a clear advantage although NATO’s qualitative edge would certainly have helped the 
Alliance. All in all it seems that NATO’s air forces would have been able to disrupt and 
delay the Warsaw Pact offensive to a greater degree than the Warsaw Pact’s air power 







MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 
 NATO and the Warsaw Pact both maintained a significant number of their 
combat forces outside of Central Europe and planned to reinforce their units in Central 
Europe with these forces through mobilization and reinforcement. The transformation of 
a nation from a peacetime to a wartime setting is called mobilization and usually 
requires a decision by the national government or chief of state. Mobilization includes, 
but is not limited to the preparation of civilian transport systems (road, rail, and air) for 
military use, the calling up of reserve units, the increase in production of military 
supplies and equipment, and the deployment of reinforcements to a crisis area.319 
Reinforcement capabilities are not just measured in terms of numbers of ships and 
aircraft available to move military units but are affected by the logistical infrastructure 
(ports, roads, rail line, and airfields), the military command and control systems, and the 
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readiness of the units and platforms involved.320 In analyzing the affect that mobilization 
and reinforcement capabilities would have on combat operations in Europe several 
different factors must be examined. The time that each nation would have to accomplish 
its mobilization and reinforcement objectives needs to be defined. The plans of each 
alliance system for reinforcement should be understood so that an investigation of 
capabilities can determine the ability of each alliance to complete its reinforcement 
goals. It is typical of military organizations, given their generally conservative nature, to 
overestimate the capabilities of their enemy and to underestimate their own.321 While 
this is useful in convincing national legislatures or leaders to increase the military’s 
percentage of the national budget it is not as helpful in determining the exact resources 
available to each side. An excellent analysis of this type of thinking can be found in 
Appendix 3 in one of Churchill’s letters written during the Second World War.  
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 The most important issue for the success of mobilization and reinforcement on 
either side was the time available for these processes to occur. Since the Warsaw Pact 
would have initiated combat operations in this scenario the first issue is the time that 
Pact forces would have taken to mobilize. Some defense analysts in the 1980s held that 
the Pact would begin an assault on NATO with little or no preparation, moving directly 
from an exercise into the attack. However the pattern of Soviet operations throughout the 
Cold War as well as the relative balance of forces strongly suggests that the Soviets 
would take weeks or months to prepare for an attack on NATO.322 Soviet forces took 
several weeks to mobilize before beginning operations in Hungary (1956), 
Czechoslovakia (1968), Afghanistan (1979), and Poland (1980).323 Additionally the 
greatest Soviet advantage in terms of ground forces in Central Europe relative to NATO 
would have occurred after about 14 days of mobilization, assuming that NATO does not 
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begin to mobilize until several days after the Soviets start.324 The improvements in 
NATO’s capabilities and readiness in the 1980s would have made a ‘standing start’ 
attack much more risky than an attack preceded by a period of mobilization.325 After a 
month of mobilization NATO would have rough parity with the Warsaw Pact326 and so 
it seems clear that the Pact would have attacked before this point. The Soviet operational 
plan has been examined in detail previously but it is sufficient to say that the plan would 
have necessitated 2-3 weeks of mobilization prior to the start of combat operations.327 
This scenario will proceed on the assumption that the Warsaw Pact begins combat 
operations after 14 days of mobilization.  
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 The second issue to examine is the time delay between the Pact decision to 
mobilize and the NATO decision to mobilize. It is important to keep in mind that NATO 
could not order its member states to begin a military mobilization. As an alliance of free 
and sovereign states each nation would have had to decide individually to begin 
mobilization. This assures that NATO’s mobilization decision would not have been 
unanimous in terms of timing.328 What was likely was that over a period of 2-3 days 
each NATO government would have made the decision to mobilize. In a crisis situation 
the historical trend seems to be that once one member of a alliance commences 
mobilization the other states follow soon after, such as in August 1914.  
 The decision by NATO governments to mobilize would have been based on the 
intelligence data regarding Pact mobilization as well as the perception of Soviet 
intentions. An examination of NATO, particularly US, intelligence capabilities suggests 
that NATO would have had clear warning indicators once a Pact mobilization began.329 
The development of reconnaissance satellites made surprise warfare much more difficult 
during the Cold War. In the 1980s the US had an array of photographic, active radar, and 
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electromagnetic satellites to monitor Soviet activities that could provide information 
about every foot of Soviet territory day and night.330 US satellites were generally multi-
mission platforms that had extremely high resolution cameras.331 US naval intelligence 
was well positioned to detect an upswing in Soviet naval activity.332 Historically NATO 
intelligence was adept in detecting Soviet preparations for operations in Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, and Afghanistan.333 All in all it seems clear that NATO’s intelligence apparatus 
would have been able to detect a Warsaw Pact mobilization early on and pass that 
information to their political leaders.334 This scenario will assume that NATO’s decision 
to mobilize was, on average, 10 days prior to the start of combat operations and therefore 
4 days after the Pact began to mobilize. There certainly would have been some variance 
in the timing of individual NATO’s governments and the larger nations would probably 
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have begun to mobilize earlier rather than later. The examination of mobilization and 
reinforcement capabilities will proceed under these assumptions. 
European NATO 
 NATO’s reinforcement plans are best considered in a national context although 
there is one major exception to this approach. SACEUR’s335 multi-national reaction 
force was called the Allied Mobile Force and was made up of 7 battalions336 of infantry 
with supporting artillery, engineers, air defense, and armored reconnaissance units and 4 
squadrons of fighters.337 This total of around 2 brigades worth of troops trained annually 
for operations in Norway and most likely would have been deployed there in a crisis 
situation.338 This unit could deploy in 2-6 days339 and therefore would have been 
available in Norway for operations given NATO’s overall mobilization time. Aside from 
this force NATO’s reinforcement plans were formulated and coordinated on a primarily 
national basis. For example the US entered into separate agreements with Belgium, the 
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Netherlands, and West Germany regarding the use of their national transportation 
systems during wartime. These agreements were made in a NATO context but not 
through NATO channels.  
For Central European nations the task of mobilization and reinforcement was 
somewhat simpler than for the US or the UK because there were no water barriers that 
had to be crossed. West Germany maintained a large Territorial Army that would have 
been mobilized to support the professional Field Army in a crisis. All of the West 
German reservists in the Territorial Army could be at their units and deployed within 72 
hours of a mobilization order.340 The Territorial Army was composed of 12 Home 
Defense Brigades and 15 Home Defense Regiments each with 3-5 battalions.341 The 12 
Home Defense Brigades would have been capable of front line duties while the Defense  
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Regiments were better suited to rear area security and dealing with Pact airborne and 
airmobile troops.343 So West Germany would have been able to deploy 12 additional 
brigades for front line duty and 15 brigade equivalents for rear area security. Many of 
the reservists in the Territorial Army were assigned to support units that would serve the 
Field Army and the Territorial Army’s combat formations. Figure 4 shows the 
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breakdown of active and reserve troops in each of the Bundeswehr’s formations. The 
figure shows that West German reservists played a crucial role in filling out corps and 
division support units as well as providing extra combat formations to supplement the 
Field Army.344 The extensive West German road and rail network would have proved 
invaluable in moving these units to their combat positions although most units were 
stationed very near their positions. However West German reserves would also have 
made important contributions to the ability of US forces to operate. Through a WHNS345 
agreement the West Germans would have provided 93,000 reservists to support US 
combat forces and aid in the transport of US reinforcements.346 These reservists allowed 
the United States to deploy a higher percentage of combat units than would have been 
possible otherwise and allowed the US reinforcement plan to focus on combat forces 
over support forces in the initial stages. 
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 The Belgian Army would have needed to mobilize and transport Belgian forces 
moving from Belgium to their combat stations in West Germany would have needed 4 
days to form up in Belgium and move out.347 The Belgians also maintained WHNS 
agreements with the US and UK and regularly practiced these arrangements through 
joint exercises.348 In order to protect their national transportation systems the Belgians 
would have deployed 2 mechanized infantry brigades to protect their national 
territory.349 Three of the six Belgian active brigades is stationed in the FRG and the 
others would need to move from their locations in Belgium to combat positions in West 
Germany. Figure 5 shows the deployment of Belgian forces in Belgium. The entire 
Belgian I Corps, consisting of 6 brigades, could be deployed within hours of a 
mobilization according to the Belgian government.350 While this statement is optimistic 
the transportations that would have been used were well suited for Belgian purposes.  
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There are a number of east-west roads in northern Germany that would have facilitated 
the movement of these forces and the Belgian national railroad was integrated with the 
West German railroads. Additionally the figure shows that the Belgian forces all are 
located on major road and rail lines. All in all given a 10 day mobilization period the 
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Belgians would have been able to transport their forces from Belgium to West Germany 
and deploy the I Belgian Corps to combat positions. 
The Dutch reserve system was one of the most efficient in NATO. Whole units 
went from active duty to the reserves and so the members of a Dutch battalion would 
serve together during their entire military career. This meant that Dutch reserve units 
were some of the most effective in NATO and would have been available quickly for 
deployment. Similarly to the Belgians, the Dutch kept eight of their ten brigades on 
Dutch territory and these units would have been moved roughly 350km to northern West 
Germany in a crisis upon a mobilization order.352 The deployment of these forces in the 
Netherlands is shown in Figure 6. The combat forces could reach their positions in the 
FRG in 3-4 days while the support and logistic forces would take 7-14 days.353 This is 
because most of the support forces are reservists who needed to be mobilized before 
deployment. The Dutch had pre-positioned fuel and ammunition in the FRG that would 
have been used by reinforcing Dutch units, allowing them to focus their  
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Figure 6 Dutch Forces in Netherlands354 
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transportation efforts on combat forces.355 Given the Dutch preparations for mobilization 
and the availability of transportation systems it seems that all of the combat units of I 
Netherlands Corps and most of the logistical units would have been in place when 
combat operations began. The movement of the remainder of the Dutch support units 
forward certainly would have been complicated by Warsaw Pact airstrikes on the West 
German transportation system. However the longer deployment time of these units 
would have not significantly affected the initial ability of I Netherlands Corps to remain 
in combat since the Dutch could take advantage of West German supplies and 
ammunition in a shortage situation. The Dutch also contributed a marine battalion to the 
Dutch-UK Marine Commando Brigade which will be examined later. 
 The involvement of France on NATO’s side in a conflict in 1987 has already 
been shown to be the most likely course of events. Given this commitment the French 
capability to reinforce NATO must be considered. Similarly to the Belgians and the 
Dutch the French contribution would have consisted of combat forces as well as 
transportation and logistical systems. In peacetime France maintained three armored 
divisions in West Germany near the French border. French and NATO authorities had 
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worked out arrangements where French ground forces would counterattack under NATO 
control while remaining under French command.356 The balance of the French 1st Army 
was positioned to be able to reinforce NATO in a crisis situation. This force consisted of 
a total of 6 armored divisions, 2 light armored divisions, 2 motor rifle divisions, and 2 
reserve Armored Cavalry Regiments.357 French army reservists could be mobilized in 96 
hours358 and would primarily fill out combat support units.359. Additionally French 
reserves would form into 8 Home Defense Brigades and 22 combined arms regiments.360 
The movement of French forces east to support West Germany was practiced every year 
since 1964 and the French national railroad (SNCF) and the German national railway 
(Bundesbahn) are thoroughly integrated.361 Figure 7 shows the deployment of French 
forces as well as the transportation networks that would have been utilized to move these 
forces forward. Overall the French 1st Army and the Rapid Reaction Force of another 4  
divisions would be deployed in West German within 8 days while the support units  
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Figure 7 French Forces in France362 
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would have needed 6-13 days to be fully in place.363 Given the time allotted for NATO’s 
mobilization it seems that all of France’s combat forces would have been in place to 
support NATO and a percentage of the support units would be ready. France’s 
contribution to NATO’s reinforcement was not limited to extra combat formations. 
France provided critical ports, roads, airfields, and railways that would have been used 
by reinforcing US and UK units especially. The French and British completed an 
agreement in 1976 that would have allowed British reinforcements for the British Army 
of the Rhine to transit through France and this agreement was practiced on several 
occasions.364 In the early 1980s France and Spain completed upgrades to their national 
highway and railroad systems that would have facilitated the movement of these 
reinforcements.365 The French and Spanish highways were connected and this would 
have opened up Spanish ports to play a role in receiving NATO reinforcements.366 
French air and maritime forces were deployed to protect their national airspace as well 
as their ports.  
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 Denmark maintained a small standing army in peacetime but recognized the need 
to be able to quickly deploy additional forces to defend against Pact assaults by land or 
by sea. The 30,000 active duty forces would be increased to 110,000 through 
mobilization and the 5 active brigades would be filled up to stated strength through the 
addition of reservists.367 The Regional Defense Forces total 14,000 men and were tasked 
with rear area security and the defense of key installations.368 Most of the reservists in 
the Danish army are deployed in support elements and these units would take a week to 
become ready for operations.369 The active forces could have been fully mobilized and 
deployed in 3 days.370Denmark refused to allow foreign forces to be stationed on its 
national territory and depended on reinforcements from West Germany and the UK.371 
Denmark’s generally more cool view of NATO meant that the Danish decision to 
mobilize would have come later in the NATO mobilization process. Even with this delay 
it seems clear that Danish combat forces and most of the support forces would be combat 
ready and in position by the time combat operations commenced. 
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 Norway presented a special challenge for NATO’s reinforcement plans. Control 
of northern Norway was imperative for the execution of the Maritime Strategy as well as 
the interdiction of Soviet submarines moving into the North Atlantic. However Norway 
did not allow foreign nations to station troops on its national territory in peacetime. 
NATO members were allowed to pre-position equipment and the Canadians, Americans, 
British, and Dutch all took advantage of this. Additionally Norway developed a very 
efficient reserve system that would have reinforced the regular army of 39,000 troops 
with 99,000 more in a total of 12 infantry brigades.372 In 36 hours the Norwegians could 
mobilize these 12 brigades to reinforce their forces in northern Norway against a Soviet 
overland invasion.373 It would take 2 days of mobilization for 3 reserve brigades to reach 
north Norway and 2 more brigades would arrive by day 4.374 Norway would probably 
have begun its mobilization later than other NATO nations due to the Norwegian 
government’s desire to not increase tensions with the Soviet Union.375 
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 Mobilization followed by reinforcement from overseas caused a unique set of 
challenges that Canada, the UK, and the US had to face. Units coming across a body of 
water needed to first be mobilized and gathered at their base before being moved to an 
airfield or port for their transport. After loading onto their transportation system, the 
actual transport of the unit would occur, followed by unloading and moving to the area 
of operations. With regard to airlift one should not think of this process as moving whole 
brigades or divisions at a time. Rather elements of brigade would enter the 
‘reinforcement pipeline’ in sequence and be transported in turn. Therefore the time 
needed for reinforcement must include the period needed to cycle a unit piece by piece 
into the pipeline. 
 Canada maintained forces for commitment to two different reinforcement areas. 
Canadian forces in West Germany needed 1,400 soldiers from Canada to be fully 
operational376 and Canada had dedicated the CAST377 Brigade to Norway in a crisis. 
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One battalion of the CAST had its equipment prepositioned in Norway and the other two 
would have needed to move by sealift.378 It would take 21 days to move the sealift 
battalions into position.379 The CRAF’s roughly 40 transport aircraft380 would have been 
used to move the reinforcements for Canadian forces in West Germany to Europe. Given 
around 10 days of mobilization Canada would have brought the Canadian Brigade 
Group in Europe up to strength and would have been in the process of deploying the 
CAST when combat commenced. 
 The United Kingdom had three different areas of focus in a NATO crisis. The 
British forces in Germany, the British Army of the Rhine (BOAR), needed 
reinforcement, the United Kingdom Mobile Force (UKMF) was to be deployed to 
Denmark, and the Dutch-UK Marine Commando Brigade would have been sent to 
Norway. British plans called for the movement of the 2nd Infantry Division, 4 infantry 
brigades, and several Territorial Army (TA) units to West Germany.381 The British 
practiced moving these forces in 1980 and again in 1984 during mobilization 
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exercises.382 This movement and the deployment of the BOAR would have required 96 
hours (4 days) overall.383 Additionally the British had to withdraw 10 infantry battalions 
from the BOAR to patrol Northern Ireland in the early 1980s. These infantry forces 
could be back in Central Europe in 72 hours where their equipment was stored.384 The 
British Army Reserves were dedicated primarily to filling out Regular Army units while 
the Territorial Army (TA) had full combat formations.385 The TA had around 10 
brigades of infantry and an armored reconnaissance brigade that met one evening a week 
and one weekend a month for training and refresher courses.386 The United Kingdom 
Mobile Force of 17,000 men was a reinforced mechanized infantry brigade, the 1st 
Infantry Brigade, and would have been deployed to Denmark in 6 days.387 The UKMF 
was to aid Danish forces in defending against Pact amphibious operations and included a 
logistics group. The Dutch-UK Marine Commando Force included a battalion of Royal 
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Dutch Marines (the 1st Amphibious Combat Group) and the 3rd UK Commando 
Brigade.388 This force was trained for arctic operations and would have been moved to 
Norway through sealift in a week’s time.389 The British exercises in 1980 and 1984 
demonstrated a clear understanding of the proper way to combine sealift, airlift, and pre-
positioning to quickly move in reinforcing combat formations. It seems clear that the 
United Kingdom would have been able to reinforce the BOAR, deploy the UKMF, and 
assist Norway with the Marine group in the 10 days of mobilization in this scenario. 
 In terms of reinforcements the United States was the most important part of 
NATO’s mobilization process. So much of NATO’s energy and resources were 
dedicated to ensuring that US ground forces would be able to reach Central Europe and 
therefore it is important to understand US reinforcement and mobilization capabilities. In 
a crisis the US President can declare an emergency which allows him to call up 1 million 
reservists for 24 months; if Congress declares an emergency than all US reserves can be 
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activated and conscription instituted.390 A decision by the US President to declare an 
emergency would have been seen as a very important step on NATO’s part in moving 
towards military readiness. US reinforcement plans called for several different 
operations. First US troops were to be airlifted to Central Europe to take meet up with  
pre-positioned equipment stationed there. Secondly US sealift resources were to be used 
to move US troops and their equipment from the US to Europe as those troops became 
available for movement. Thirdly a large percentage of the US Air Force stationed in the 
US would have been redeployed to Europe. Finally US Marines were to move to 
Norway to aid in its defense. An examination of each of these operations will quickly 
show the complexity and massive nature of the US reinforcement effort. The US was 
committed to have 10 Army divisions, 60 tactical fighter squadrons, and a Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade in place in Europe along with the necessary support elements 
within a 10 day period.391 This was known as the ‘Ten in Ten’ commitment, instituted 
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by President Carter in 1978,392 Overall the US sought to meet its NATO reinforcement 
goals through a combination of sealift, triad, and prepositioning. 
 The US planned to move several divisions to Europe quickly to supplement its 
forces there, bringing the total number of US divisions in place to 10. 5 1/3 divisions 
were already stationed in West Germany.393 The goal therefore was to bring in another 
5-6 divisions through the use of pre-positioned equipment, known as POMCUS394. The 
idea was that a unit in the US would have two sets of equipment, one in the US and one 
in Europe. This meant that in a crisis only the troops would need to be moved to Europe 
instead of all the equipment as well. POMCUS equipment was deployed so that all the 
equipment for a combat unit was in one location, maintained in temperature regulated 
warehouses and depots. The equipment was placed in West Germany around the Weser 
River395 and in Belgium and the Netherlands. When used in exercises POMCUS 
                                                 
392 John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 220. 
393 2 armored divisions, 2 mechanized infantry divisions, 1 armored brigade, 1 mechanized infantry 
brigade, and 2 armored cavalry regiments 
394 Prepositioning of Material Configured in Unit Sets 
395 Faringdon, Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Superpowers, 358. 
 
 139
equipment had 97-98% operational readiness396 due to the extensive maintenance that 
was continually performed on the equipment. POMCUS equipment did not include 
lightweight expensive equipment such as computers and helicopters and these would 
have been airlifted to Europe.397 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the US maintained 3 
division sets of POMCUS equipment in Europe to reinforce the US V and VII Corps in 
central West Germany as well as equipment for support and logistical forces and an 
Armored Cavalry Regiment. In 1979 the decision was made to add 3 more divisional 
sets to this total.398 Two of the divisional sets of POMCUS equipment only contained 2 
brigades worth of equipment instead of the standard 3 brigades as the 3rd brigade for 
each of those units399 was already stationed in West Germany.400 By 1984 1 of the new 
divisional sets was in place401 and by 1987 all 3 had been deployed, bringing the total 
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amount of POMCUS equipment to 6 divisions with over 500,000 tons of material.402 If 
the US could move the necessary troops to Europe to man this equipment then the 
number of US ground troops in place would have more than doubled. 
 The aircraft dedicated to move the troops taking advantage of POMCUS 
equipment would have come from the Military Airlift Command (MAC), the Civilian 
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and contributions by other NATO allies. MAC owned the 
Air Force’s long range transport aircraft while the CRAF was composed of civilian 
passenger and freight aircraft that could be called into government service on short 
notice. The CRAF was primarily responsible for moving US troops while MAC carried 
equipment.403 Additionally NATO governments had pledged substantial numbers of 
their own national airlines to aid in moving US reinforcements to Europe.404 Table 8 
details the aircraft available to airlift troops and materials to Europe in 1987. 
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C-5 66 15   
C-141 222 16   
C-130 206 296   
KC-10 56    
Cargo407   77 28408
Passenger409   253410 80411
 
 
Most of the military cargo that needed to be airlifted to Europe could be carried either by 
civilian freight aircraft or military transports. Only certain items such as jeeps, trucks, 
and helicopters had to be carrier in military transports.412 This ensured that civilian 
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aircraft could make a significant contribution to moving military cargo. Most of the 
CRAF aircraft were on 24-48 hour notice413 and in the Persian Gulf War the CRAF 
system performed remarkably well.414 Utilizing mostly CRAF aircraft it would have 
taken a little over 2 days of transit time to move the troops using POMCUS equipment 
from the US to European airfields.415 The tanker aircraft of the MAC would also have 
been used to support the deployment of 60 squadrons of aircraft to Europe. The support 
equipment for some of these squadrons would have been transported in just over 4 days 
by using military transports and civilian freight aircraft.416 The movement of these 
troops would have been aided by the 230 airfields that NATO had at its disposal.417 Of 
the 2000 aircraft that the US planned to deploy, 1000 had pre-assigned European based 
where support equipment and ammunition was pre-positioned.418 The movement of US 
ground forces to Germany to use POMCUS equipment was practiced every year through 
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the REFORGER419  exercises. Given 10 days of mobilization it seems clear that US and 
NATO airlift capabilities were more than sufficient to bring 6 US divisions, 1 Armored 
Cavalry Regiment, and multiple support units into Central Europe to use POMCUS 
equipment. 
 The movement of these units to Europe was to be followed by the deployment of 
further US forces through the use sealift. Sealift was also responsible for bringing in the 
material and items needed to resupply NATO forces. The ability of NATO’s maritime 
and air forces to protect trans-Atlantic military convoys from significant Soviet 
interdiction has already been shown. This allows for an examination of US and NATO 
sealift capabilities. The first US sealift assets were the 8 SL-7 Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) 
which together were able to carry the equipment for a full division in one crossing. 
These ships could be ready for service in 4 days, load and unload in 1 day, and cross the 
Atlantic in 4 days. 420 The Military Sealift Command (MSC) could also mobilize 26 
cargo ships and tankers of the Common User Fleet as well as the Ready Reserve Fleet of 
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85 ships in 10-20 days.421 A further 324 ships could be called into military service due to 
contracts between the MSC and US commercial carriers.422 In addition to all of these 
ships NATO members had pledged to contribute over 500 cargo and tanker ships to 
support NATO resupply efforts and US reinforcement.423 Given this vast reserve of 
shipping to draw on it seems that NATO would have been able to transport supplies and 
materials to Europe with comparative ease. The tankers would have been able to draw on 
the 541 million barrels of petroleum the US kept in 4 storage sites along the Gulf 
Coast.424 In terms of moving US ground troops after 10 days of mobilization only 1 
division could be expected to be in place due to the limited number of FSSs. This 
division would be unloading and moving to the front as combat operations commenced. 
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The arrival of further US combat formations would be dependent on the time needed for 
US Army Reserve and National Guard units to become ready for deployment. After the 
movement of 7 Army divisions425 to Europe almost all of the heavy (armored and 
mechanized infantry) units left in the US would be Reserve and National Guard units.426 
 The US Army Reserves were primarily support units while the National Guard 
had a higher percentage of combat formations.427 The National Guard had 17 divisions 
stationed in the US, 9 of which were heavy divisions.428 A Selected Reserve Force of 6 
Guard divisions and 3 brigades would have been ready for combat in under 5 weeks and 
it is these forces that would have been the first to be transported by sealift to Europe.429 
The balance of the Guard formations would have been available after roughly 8 weeks of 
mobilization.430 Army Reserve units were generally support formations431 and were held 
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a higher level of readiness since there were only enough support and logistical units in 
the Active Army to support 5.5 divisions.432 US Army Reservists were required to be at 
their units and ready for deployment within in 96 hours of mobilization.433 While Army 
Reserve units could have been deployed in time to provide support for Active Army 
divisions in Central Europe it seems that National Guard combat formations would have 
taken around a month at the earliest to come into action. 
 The final component of US reinforcement plans was the deployment a Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to Norway. This unit was composed of a reinforced 
Marine infantry brigade, support elements, and several squadrons of tactical aircraft.434 
The Marines had much of their equipment prepositioned in Norway and would have 
been able to deploy within 4-6 days of a mobilization order.435 The 4 ships of the 
Marine’s Maritime Prepositioning Squadron in the Eastern Atlantic would have provided 
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 147
equipment and supplies for an airlifted Marine brigade to support the MEB.436 Given a 
month the Marines could have gathered the necessary amphibious shipping to move a 
full Marine division in one lift437 but this would have had little bearing on the initial or 
even subsequent operations in Norway. Given NATO’s mobilization time the Marines 
would have been able to deploy 1 brigade to Norway and the second would have been on 
its way. 
 In summary given 10 days of mobilization NATO would have been able to 
accomplish the following reinforcement goals. The British, West German, and Belgians 
would have all their combat and support forces in place while the French, Danes, and 
Dutch would have all their combat forces and most of their support forces deployed. The 
Canadians would have most of their combat and support forces ready while the US 
would have deployed almost of all of its available Active Army divisions and the 
necessary support units. Norwegian forces would have partially moved into Northern 
Norway along with the CAST, Dutch-UK Marine Commando Force, and the US MEB. 
All in all NATO seems to have been capable of reaching its mobilization objectives. 
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17 37  54 
Belgium 2 3  5 
Netherlands 3 7  10 
France 8 10  18 
Denmark  7  7 
Norway  2 10 12 
Canada  1  1 
UK 8 5 3 15 




56 84 2 142 
NATO 
Norway441
 2 12 14 
Total NATO 56 86 14 156 
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Table 9 summarizes NATO’s ground forces in place in Europe at the end of 10 days of 
mobilization. 
Warsaw Pact  
 On the surface the Warsaw Pact’s mobilization and reinforcement capabilities 
seem to suffer less from some of the difficulties that NATO had to deal with. The Pact’s 
reinforcements would move almost exclusively over friendly territory after a single 
mobilization order given by the Soviet government and on paper these reinforcements 
were more numerous than NATO’s. In wartime the Soviet military would have assumed 
direct operational control of Warsaw Pact formations in order to facilitate military 
efficiency. However margin of superiority was not that large and several transportation 
and readiness issues would have challenged Pact reinforcement operations. 
 The Warsaw Pact would have sought to deploy some East German, Czech, and 
Polish troops against NATO forces while retaining others for internal security 
operations. An examination of potential Pact reliability in a combat situation has shown 
that East Germany, Polish, and Czech troops would most likely have followed 
deployment orders. In the case of the Poles and Czechs only a part of their national 
militaries were trained and equipped to operate with Soviet forces in combat operations. 
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Table 10 details the ground forces that these nations planned on contributing to a Soviet 
offensive in Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact differentiated the readiness and 
effectiveness of its combat formations between three different tiers, known as Category 
I, II, & III. East European Category I units were those held at a high state of readiness, 
equipped with more modern equipment, and trained to a higher standard.442 Those units 
would have been used in combat operations against NATO troops. Category II and III 
units were held at lower states of readiness and generally had obsolete equipment.443 
They were suited for internal security duties as well as protecting Soviet lines of 
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Table 10 Non-Soviet Pact Forces444 










 Motor Rifle 
Divisions 
Poland 5 3  5 
East Germany 2 4   
Czechoslovakia 1 3 4 2 
 
 
It is important to keep in mind that ‘modern’ equipment for the Eastern European 
nations was on average a generation behind ‘modern’ Soviet equipment. Additionally 
Eastern European units needed longer periods of time than Soviet units before they were 
combat ready as their readiness standards were not as demanding.445 East German 
Category I units needed 3 days of mobilization while Polish and Czech Category I units 
needed 10 days.446 Given the relatively short distances that Polish and especially Czech 
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NATO Central Front and the Balance of Uncertainty," 28. 
445 Cordesman, "The NATO Central Front and the Balance of Uncertainty," 36. 




and East German troops would have had to travel to reach the Inner German Border 
(IGB) it seems clear that given the Pact’s 14 days of mobilization the designated units 
would have been able to participate in combat operations from the start. 
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 Soviet mobilization and reinforcement was a much larger and more involved 
process than it was for Eastern European nations. Soviet males 19-22 served 2-3 years 
on active duty and then were in the reserves until age 50.447 Soviet forces stationed 
within the USSR totaled over 120 divisions and while Soviet doctrine called for 
operations that would lead to a speedy termination of hostilities Soviet mobilization 
plans were clearly designed for a long, protracted conflict.448 Soviet ground forces were 
also divided into three tiers of readiness: Category I, II, & III. Soviet forces in Eastern 
Europe were held at Category I readiness and would have been ready for action within 
24 hours.449 The Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), the Northern Group of 
Forces (NGF) in Poland, the Central Group of Forces (CGF) in Czechoslovakia, and the 
Southern Group of Forces (SGF) in Hungary made up the Soviet deployments in Eastern 
Europe. In general these forces were deployed not as combat forces but as armies of 
occupation with their divisions spread out.450 Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10 illustrate 
the broad positioning of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.  
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Figure 8 Soviet Forces in East Germany and Poland451 
                                                 





Figure 9 Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia452 
 
Figure 10 Soviet Forces in Hungary453 
                                                 
452 Ibid., 16. 
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After a mobilization order these formations would have gathered their troops and then 
moved from their occupation stations to combat positions near the Inner German Border. 
Table 11 shows the deployment of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe broken down by 
country. The Groups of Forces in East Germany and Czechoslovakia were larger due to 
their greater proximity to NATO forces. 
 
 
Table 11 Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe454 
Soviet Group of Forces Armored Divisions Motor Rifle Divisions 
Germany (East Germany) 11 8 
Northern (Poland) 2  
Central (Czechoslovakia) 2 3 
Southern (Hungary) 2 2 
Total Eastern Europe 17 13 
 
 
Soviet units stationed in the USSR were generally held at Category II or III 
readiness. Category II units would have needed right around 30 days to go through 
                                                                                                                                                
453 Ibid., 17. 
454 Miller, The Cold War: A Military History, 251-52. All Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were maintained 
at Category I status 
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refresher training and draw the balance of their equipment from reserves.455 After this 
period of preparation Category II units would have begun moving to East Germany 
using the rail lines that linked the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East 
Germany. Soviet Category III units would have needed around 90 days of mobilization 
in order to become operational and even then these units would lack some of their 
equipment, which on the whole would be obsolete.456 Figure 11 illustrates the locations 
of Soviet Military Districts and Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs) while Figure 12 
focuses on the Western USSR. The Southern TVD was focused on potential Middle East 
contingencies and was responsible for operations in Afghanistan. The Far Eastern 
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TVD’s mission was to act as a counter to Chinese forces which the Soviets viewed as a 




Figure 11 Soviet Military Districts458 
                                                 
457 Erickson, Hansen, and Schneider, Soviet Ground Forces: An Operational Assessment, 42, Hoffenaar 
and Findlay, "Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War: An Oral History 
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Given that the Chinese military was the only one in the world that could outdo 
the Soviets in terms of manpower, the Soviet’s traditional strength, the Soviet military 
was understandably concerned about maintaining an effective deterrent against Chinese 
forces. Table 12 shows the deployment of Soviet units within the USSR. It is important 
to note that only 4 divisions from the Western Theater of Military Operations were 
maintained at Category I status. These 4 divisions would have been available within 24 
hours for transport to the East Germany or Czechoslovakia, the staging grounds for the 
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Table 12 Soviet Forces in the USSR460 
Military District461 Cat I 
Armored 
Divisions









Western TVD462     
Belorussian 1 1 9 1 
Carpathian 1 1 3 9 
Baltic   3 7 
Southwestern TVD     
Kiev   8 8 
Odessa    8 
Northwestern TVD     
Leningrad  1  10 
Southern TVD     
North Caucasus   1 7 
Trans-Caucasus    11 
Turkestan    6 
Afghanistan  5   
Central Reserve     
Moscow  2 2 5 
Volga    4 
Ural   1 5 
Far Eastern TVD     
Central Asia   1 7 
Siberian    6 
Transbaikal   2 11 
Far East   2 22 
Mongolia 2 2   
                                                 
460 IISS, The Military Balance, 1988-1989, 39-44, Keegan, ed., World Armies, 635. 
461 Several Military Districts made up each Theater of Military Operations 
462 TVD: Theater of Military Operation 
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Soviet offensive into Western Europe. Additionally 2 divisions from the Moscow region 
were available for use in Central Europe on short notice. 
The varying amounts of Soviet forces in different states of readiness limited the 
efficiency of the Warsaw Pact transportation system in moving units to the front line. 
The efficiency of the transportation system would be maximized if reinforcing units 
achieved combat readiness and become ready for transport at a steady rate. However, 
reserve units would have attained combat status in large blocks according to their 
Category readiness numbers, whether I, II, or III. There would be some variation in 
mobilization time but by and large the Category II units for example, would “stand up” 
to active status within a few days of each other because of the similar readiness levels of 
personnel and equipment that they are assigned. The 5 Category I units available for 
rapid use in the Western USSR would not have taxed the transportation system at all 
especially given that the movement of those forces would have occurred prior to the start 
of combat operations.463 Following this was would have been a period of more minimal 
use as Category II and III units mobilized. Around 30 days after mobilization the system 
would have been overloaded by the deluge of Category II units becoming ready for 
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transport to the front. This is the first time since mobilization that the transportation grid 
is being utilized to capacity. At this point the bottleneck to Soviet reinforcement of their 
forces in Central Europe becomes the carrying capability of the transportation system 
and not the readiness of combat formation. Eventually this bottleneck would be reduced 
after the majority of Category II units in the Western TVD arrived in Central Europe 
only to spark up again when Category III divisions became active. The result of all of 
this would be an initial dearth of units ready to move and then an overwhelming demand 
for transport. 
The structure and layout of the transportation system these Soviet reinforcements 
were to travel over also posed problems for the Warsaw Pact. Given the large number of 
units that were stationed in Eastern Europe in peacetime and the expense involved, the 
Soviets did not pre-position equipment for reinforcing formations in Eastern Europe. 
Reserves moving forward would come with their equipment and this necessitated 
transport by rail. There were 8 major rail lines that ran from East Germany to the Soviet 
Union through Poland and Czechoslovakia.464 However the railroad gauge in the Soviet 
                                                 




Union was different from that in Eastern Europe and so cargo had to change trains when 
crossing the Soviet border at 9 transshipment complexes.465 These complexes made 
excellent targets for NATO’s Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA) plans that sought to 
delay the arrival of Soviet reinforcements. This need to switch track gauge would have 
exacerbated the bottleneck when Soviet Category II units become operational. 
The final concern for Soviet reinforcement and mobilization plans was training 
and past performance. While the month of retraining that Category II units were to 
receive was similar to the time US National Guard formations planned on spending in 
retraining466, the annual training time was rather different. While US Reserve and 
National Guard units have 30-45 days of training each year Soviet reserves had little if 
any. Additionally the small percentage of Category II and III personnel that were on 
active duty year round had to spend much of their time on equipment maintenance and 
not field training.467 Soviet experience with mobilization orders was generally 
disappointing. In 1980 the Politburo ordered a mobilization in the Carpathian, Baltic, 
and Belorussian military districts in preparation for an intervention in Poland. Many 
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reservists failed to report for duty, could not be located, or deserted upon arrival at their 
unit. So many deserted that efforts to find and punish them were called off with the 
result that the coordination of personnel and equipment movement suffered.468 East 
European reservist performance was similar with regard to exercises, not just potential 
combat operations.469 Given the inefficient use of the railroad network, lower training 
standards, and past performance the Soviet reinforcement and mobilization process 
would have suffered in a crisis situation. With 14 days of mobilization the Soviets could 
have placed all their forces in Eastern Europe as well as a small number of 
reinforcements from the USSR along the IGB in preparation for combat operations. 
However it would have been at least 2 more weeks before Soviet Category II units could 
have contributed to the Warsaw Pact invasion. 
The units that the Warsaw Pact maintained at the highest levels of readiness were well 
placed and prepared to participate in combat operations on short notice. The ‘favored’ 
units in the East German, Polish, and Czech militaries would have had little difficulty in 
supporting a Pact invasion. The spearhead of this attack, the Soviet forces in East 
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Germany and Czechoslovakia, would have been well supported by Soviet 
reinforcements from Poland, Hungary, and the Western USSR. However the Soviet 
reserve system suffered from deficiencies that would have limited their early 






READINESS: TRAINING AND LOGISTICS 
 
 Readiness refers to the ability of military forces to sustain combat operations 
over an extended period of time. Readiness is based on training and the supplies that a 
nation has available to maintain its armed forces. The greater time that a formation 
spends in exercises and training the better prepared that unit will be for the rigors and 
stresses of modern warfare. The percentage of a unit’s personnel that are on active duty 
at any time directly contributes to the readiness of a unit. At the same time even the most 
well trained and prepared personnel need the tools and material to engage in battle. 
Ammunition, spare parts, batteries, fuel, and food need to be moved from production 
location to supply depots to the consumer formation in the field. Most nations stockpile 
supplies that are hard to produce quickly such as ammunition and spare parts/ However, 
it is important to keep in mind that combat operations typically consume more supplies 




Warsaw Pact Logistics 
 In the area of logistics the Warsaw Pact benefited from the Communist 
governmental structure. While the centralization of power generally inhibits the display 
of initiative and independence, in terms of coordination and priority setting the result 
usually is an increase in efficiency. The Soviet government had a much greater ability to 
ensure the ability of its industry to quickly increase production of selected items in a 
crisis than any NATO nation. The Soviets had stockpiled sufficient supplies to provide 
for the initial phases of combat operations and were careful to protect their surge 
capability in selected industries.470 In this area of readiness the status of Eastern Europe 
was rather different from the Soviet Union. Eastern European nations had smaller 
amounts of munitions and other supplies on hand and were not as capable of sustaining 
combat operations for a long period of time like the Soviet Union.471  
While the Communist system worked well to set national priorities and ensure 
adequate stockpiles of critical supplies it hampered the efficiency of the military 
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logistics structure.472 Soviet logistics rely on railroads to move supplies forward while 
trucks are only used on the tactical level to resupply forward battalions.473 Soviet 
logistical and supply planning was the model for other Warsaw Pact nations. The 
problem with this approach is the potential for Soviet forces to out run the railroad. As 
NATO units were forced to retreat they would have damaged or destroyed the 
transportation grid in their defending sector as much as possible. This would severely 
restrict the supplies that the Pact could bring forward in that sector. Historically in the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia Soviet units moved more quickly than their lines of 
communication and were out of supply for several days.474 Additionally these railroads 
were very vulnerable to NATO air attack and disruption. While a crater in a road can be 
avoided or bypassed, damage to a rail line must be repaired before service can be 
restored. For now it sufficient to say that NATO clearly recognized this vulnerability and 
developed tactics and plans to exploit it. However Soviet doctrine regarding the use of 
combat formations would work to mitigate this challenge. Soviet divisions were 
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designed to engage in high-intensity, all out offensive operations for several days and 
then be withdrawn for rest and refitting.475 Each division would go into combat with the 
necessary supplies for those days of operations and then withdraw for resupply. The 
Soviet Army assigned a much smaller percentage of its personnel to logistical operations 
than NATO. This created formations that were ‘top heavy’ and imbalanced in terms of 
logistics.476 Therefore the challenges of the Soviet logistical system would have been 
felt only after a week of combat operations as divisions that had been on the front line 
once were scheduled to go back into combat. The initial supply capability of Soviet 
formations would have allowed them to provide for early combat operations. 
NATO Logistics 
 The democratic structure of NATO’s nations had a clear affect on the status of 
NATO’s readiness in the 1980s. Upper level commanders quickly learned that national 
governments and legislatures were much more willing to appropriate money for new 
equipment and pay increases while stockpiling ammunition and spare parts was much 
less attractive. The result was that by the mid-1960s NATO’s inventories of equipment 
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and supplies were dangerously low.477 NATO militaries made a major effort in the 
1970s to increase funding for readiness programs and the results were beginning to be 
felt by the 1980s.478 Certainly there were differences on a national level in terms of 
stockpiles. While the Belgians and Danes had lower levels of munitions in storage, West 
Germany, France, and the US maintained stockpiles for around 30 days of combat 
operations.479 While these increases in stockpiles were occurring NATO was not able to 
make much progress in increasing its short term production capabilities.480 This could 
have resulted in shortages of critical supplies after the 30 day mark. One should keep in 
mind that due to the attrition on military forces engaged in combat the overall demand 
for supplies would slowly decrease. Additionally, the Falklands War in 1982 shows that 
Western democracies can “rapidly develop and deploy a number of systems that would 
have taken years under normal conditions.”481 While NATO’s initial supply capability 
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seems to have been sufficient to support combat units the potential clearly existed for 
shortages and rationing on some scale after 30 days of combat. 
 NATO’s logistical model was rather different from the Warsaw Pact’s and 
reflected a different set of military priorities. NATO sought to keep a division in combat 
for as long as possible by providing a steady stream of supplies, reinforcements, and 
replacement equipment. NATO did not have as many divisions to work with as the 
Warsaw Pact and each of these NATO units was generally equipped with more advanced 
weapons. Therefore NATO wanted to keep the maximum number of divisions in action 
that it could support so as to be able to take full advantage of its technological 
superiority.482 As a percentage of overall personnel, NATO committed almost twice as 
many soldiers to support and command structures than the Warsaw Pact in order to keep 
maintain its land lines of communication and keep its divisions in action longer.483 This 
was done because NATO planners created the organizational structure of their divisions 
on the basis of different assumptions about the relative utility of various military units 
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contributing to combat performance.484 This extra emphasis gave NATO units “greater 
flexibility, stability, and powers of recovery”485 NATO’s readiness was a mixed picture 
by 1987. Significant improvements in stockpiles ensured initial combat capability but 
shortages in surge production abilities posed potential challenges for longer term 
conflict. NATO’s logistical doctrine and training were both well suited to keeping the 
maximum number of well prepared divisions in combat. 
Warsaw Pact Training 
 In terms of personnel Warsaw Pact nations kept their units at three different 
levels of manning. Category I units had 80-90% of their personnel on station at any time, 
Category II units were kept around 50% manned, while Category III units had 10-20% 
of their personnel on active duty.486 Soviet reservists do not train together regularly and 
those small parts of reserve formations that were on active duty spent most of their time 
doing maintenance on the division’s vehicles and not field training.487 As a result of this 
only Category I divisions would be considered adequately prepared for the stresses of 
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combat. This is not to say that Category II and III formations would have been incapable 
of engaging in battle. However the damaging effects on morale and unit cohesion would 
be felt earlier in these units once combat operations began. 
 The training of Soviet active duty forces suffered from constraints due to the 
nature of the Soviet system. In the 1980s the Soviet leadership began to place a greater 
emphasis on political reliability.488 The result was an increase in political instruction in 
training that made the overall training experience less effective.489 On average a Soviet 
soldier fired 50 rounds of live ammunition a year, a Soviet tank gunner would fire 10 
live rounds, and a Soviet pilot would fly 80-90 hours a year. By comparison an 
American soldier would fire 1000 live rounds, a tank gunner 100 rounds, and a NATO 
pilot would fly over 200 hours a year.490 Soviet soldiers went through their basic training 
using different equipment than they would use in their combat units.491 Two defectors 
from the Soviet air force gave rather detailed descriptions of their experience in the 
Soviet armed forces. While these accounts much be taken with a grain of salt they detail 
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the rampant alcoholism, the deplorable care given to military personnel, and serious 
problem of hazing.492 Certainly NATO armies faced the issues of alcoholism and hazing 
but the Soviet Army’s problems were far more serious in these areas.493 The basic 
building block of an effective military organization is group solidarity, the desire to fight 
for the men in one’s platoon or company and the individual leadership of junior 
officers.494 The typical Soviet junior officer would be trained in the continuous 
repetition of assigned tasks at the direction of a tightly controlled, centralized command 
system.495 He would have difficulty in communicating with all of the men in his unit as 
a decent percentage would speak a different language.496 In a combat situation he would 
be given generally minimalistic information that only deals with their area of 
responsibility, leaving them in the dark as to how their role fits into the larger picture or 
how to effectively coordinate with other commands.497 Due to the challenges faced by 
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the Soviet training system Soviet units would not have been fully prepared for the rigors 
and stresses of modern combat. 
NATO Training 
 NATO units, both active and reserve, spent more time than their Pact 
counterparts in training exercises and active units were maintained at 90% of their total 
strength at any given time.498 NATO training sought to provide realistic field exercises 
in larger quantities than did the Warsaw Pact.499 This is not to say that there were not 
varieties of training among the NATO militaries. The training in the British, French, and 
US militaries was some of the best in NATO.500 Belgian training suffered from a lack of 
funding and this impacted the readiness of their personnel.501 On the whole NATO 
officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were schooled to be flexible and to 
demonstrate initiative.502 Generally NATO officers were given mission objectives and 
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then provided the opportunity to complete those objectives as they best saw fit. From 
1980-1985 the US military made major strides in educating and reducing the crime rates 
of its enlisted soldiers.503 NATO exercises rehearsed coordination between national 
contingents and reinforcement procedures in addition to combat operations. For example 
ever year the United States ran its REFORGER504 exercise where the use of pre-
positioned equipment to speed reinforcement was practiced. NATO published standards 
of training that most nations in the alliance were able to meet. Compliance with these 
standards ensured that NATO units would have a comparable level of experience and 
preparation for combat. 
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TERRAIN AND WEATHER 
 
 In any military operation the geography and climate of the area of operations has 
an effect on the capabilities of the forces involved. Weather can allow or restrict 
operations or confer an advantage to one side or the other. Likewise terrain and 
manmade developments to the terrain serve to inhibit or free movement. The terrain and 
weather in Central Europe would have generally aided NATO in its defensive efforts. 
The common perception during the Cold War was that southern West German was more 
defensible and northern West Germany offered a level, clear route to turn NATO’s flank. 
In reality both northern and southern West Germany were eminently suited for defensive 
purposes, but for different reasons. 
Weather 
 Northern Germany has a more temperate climate while Southern Germany has a 
more continental climate. The worst weather generally occurs in the winter where fog 
and rain restrict visibility and movement. The clearest conditions are in the summer 
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afternoons, where low visibility conditions are present only 10% of the time.505 Morning 
fogs sometimes limit visibility, especially in the southern highlands.506 Prevailing winds 
blow from west to east generally throughout Germany. Rain and melting snow in the 
spring result in deep, fast flowing rivers in the early summer.507 Rain is more common in 
the northern lowlands which brings about muddy and marshy soil conditions.508 
Terrain 
 West German terrain will be examined from north to south. Each NATO corps 
sector will be examined individually in order to highlight the ground that each national 
contingent would be defending. The road network is best considered as a whole before 
this individual corps analysis. The West German autobahn system had a large number of 
east-west routes, particularly in the British, US, and West German III Corps sectors.509 
There were fewer north-south routes and those present were weighted towards the west. 
In a conflict NATO doctrine called for the allocation of some roads for civilian use in 
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order to keep traffic off the Main Supply Routes (MSRs).510 NATO would have ordered 
civilians to stay at home in the event of a Pact attack to minimize the congestion on 
supply routes.511 This order would have been followed to greater and lesser degrees 
throughout West Germany. 
 When examining the terrain on which NATO would conduct its defense, there 
are four principles of effective use of terrain to keep mind. The defender should seek to 
take the high ground to provide increased visibility and defensibility and to screen the 
movement of friendly troops. The attacker should avoid terrain that restricts mobility, in 
particular badly drained ground and areas traversed by obstacles should be avoided in 
offensive operations. Each side should seek to control space sufficient to maneuver, 
retraining tactical flexibility. When possible formations should not deploy in front of 
impassable terrain or obstacles as this will hinder the effectiveness of the lines of 
communication.512 
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 NATO’s Northern Army Group was responsible for what is known as the North 
German Plain. For offensive operations involving heavy mechanized forces, plains and 
flat terrain are often considered ideal terrain. However, the generally flat North German 
Plain had plentiful obstacles in the form of marshes, woodlands, waterways, and large 
suburban areas.514 NORTHAG was responsible for 225 kilometers of the Inner German 
Border while CENTAG held 500 kilometers.515 NORTHAG was bordered on the north 
by Danish forces belong to AFNORTH in the area of Schleswig-Holstein. This area has 
generally flat agricultural terrain surrounding the city of Hamburg and is about 70 
kilometers wide.516 A belt of urban development extends from Hamburg to Bremen and 
is interspersed with forests, lakes, and hedges that made good defensive terrain.517 To 
the rear the Danish peninsula begins to narrow significantly, closing to a width of 50 
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kilometers between Eckernforde and Husum. Overall a fighting retreat into Denmark 
would be very defensible due to the marshy ground, lakes, inlets, and hedgerows of the 
southern Danish Peninsula.518 The narrow width of this sector would limit the forces that 
each side could deploy effectively to about 3 divisions.519 NATO would have been able 
to use the Elbe-Lübeck Canal, running from the Baltic to the Elbe River below 
Hamburg, as a natural defensive line. 
 To the south of this area was the area held by I Netherlands Corps. The IGB 
follows the Elbe River for 80 kilometers of this sector and the river is around 300 meters 
wide, making it a formidable obstacle for an attacking force. Most of the open fields in 
the area between Bremen and Hamburg running down to Hannover are a thin layer of 
loam overlying a bog of peat. This acts as a quick sand for heavy armored vehicles as the 
West Germans have learned in exercises.520 Cross-country travel is very difficult in 
these wet plains and in wet weather, which is common in this area, traffic is generally 
road bound.521 This would make offensive flanking maneuvers rather difficult. In the 
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Dutch sector a number of rivers, canals, and bogs are interspersed with the urban and 
suburban developments of Bremen and Bremerhaven.522 While Soviet doctrine called 
for the avoidance of urban combat, it also recognized that sometimes this was not 
possible.523 The belt of urban areas in this sector would have forced the Soviets into 
urban combat. Most of the urban sprawl in West Germany was residential apartment 
buildings interspersed with one and two family dwellings. The buildings were generally 
set far back from the streets and other buildings, providing clear fields of fire along the 
well-developed road networks that connected these suburban areas.524 NATO forces had 
developed specialized tactics and weapons, such as anti-tank rockets, for use in urban 
areas.525 Soviet forces also developed combined arms tactics designed to methodically 
advance a motor rifle battalion into a city with heavy artillery support.526 Given the 
preparations that both sides had taken neither would have been able to move away from 
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the historical precedent of city combat. Historically operations in urban areas have been 
long, drawn out affairs not in keeping with the Pact need for quick advances.527 
 South of I Netherlands Corps was I West German Corps. Most of this portion of 
the NATO line was covered by the Lüneberger Heath extending from Hamburg south to 
Hannover.528 The Heath was dominated by higher ground that is covered by forests that 
would significantly slow down the movement of large armored formations. The Heath 
was bordered to the east by the Elbe Side Canal (Elbeseitenkanal) which itself was 
bordered by earthen embankments on either side.529 The entire structure was 150 m wide 
and would provide a natural series of defensive obstacles that the Pact would have had to 
breach or bridge over. To the south west of the Heath lay the Weser-Aller Plain, named 
for the two rivers that run through it. A line of towns bordered the Plain to the east, 
forming a second defensive barrier, while the rivers themselves served as fall back 
positions.530 Given the extensive advantages to the defense in this area the 13 brigades 
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of the I West German Corps were well positioned to impose significant delays on a Pact 
advance. 
 Next in line to the south of the West Germans was the I UK Corps sector, about 
70-75 kilometers of front line.531 Stating the exact distance that one NATO corps held 
was difficult become one can measure based on the contours of the IGB or along a 
straight line. This area formed the southern part of the North German Plain and the 
northern stretches of the Central Highlands. From east to west it includes the cities of 
Wolfsburg, Brunswick, and Hannover as well as the Aller, Leine, and Weser Rivers. The 
Mittelland Canal, connecting the Elbe and Rhine Rivers, ran east to west dividing the 
British sector into two parts.532 North of the Canal a continuous urban and suburban 
region connected the three cities and extends all the way to the Ruhr valley near the 
Rhine River.533 On the edges of the city region lay the Börde, an agricultural area with 
more open territory, crossed by several more rivers and canals.534 To the south of the 
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Mittelland Canal a complex of wooded ridges and ranges called the Weser-Leine 
Highlands covered the land.535 This area served to channel vehicular movement from the 
southeast to the northwest through heavily forested valleys that were “magnificently 
suited to a tactical defensive.”536 The combination of urban regions and rivers in the 
north and these wooded valleys gave the I UK Corps a large number of defensive 
positions and opportunities to delay a Pact thrust. 
 The I Belgian Corps was next in line, holding 35 kilometers of front.537 The 
eastern part of their sector contained perhaps the most formidable defensive formation in 
northern West Germany, the Harz Mountains.538 The Harz extend from East Germany 
into West Germany across the IGB. On the West German side the peaks were 600-700 
meters high and divided by very steep valleys covered with rocks and forests. These 
valleys were frequented by fog throughout the year that limited visibility. Heavy rains in 
the summer added to several artificial lakes at the bottom of some of the valleys.539 
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Moving west through the Belgian sector an attacker who moved past the Harz would 
reach the southern portion of the Weser-Leine Highlands.540 These forests and ridges 
would have provided good defensive terrain for the central part of the Belgian sector.541 
Further west laid the Ruhr valley, the greatest concentration of urban and suburban 
centers in Germany.542 This belt of cities and towns continued into the Netherlands and 
Belgium and would have served to significantly delay Pact attacks into that area. The 
southern border of the Belgian sector was the northern edge of the Göttingen Corridor 
which was in the West German III Corps sector. 
CENTAG543 
 Central Army Group defended the southern part of the IGB as well as the West 
German border with Czechoslovakia. The terrain was usually broken due to mountains, 
numerous rivers, and valleys. These formations would have served to channel any attack 
into several areas of more open territory all the way across West Germany.544 In general 
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the Weser-Leine Highlands broaden out to the south. The ridges become more sloped 
and offer plenty of good defensive positions on the forward slopes.545 There were fewer 
cities in southern West Germany and more rural regions. However these rural regions 
were approximately 60% forest and village.546 On average every 12 square kilometers of 
rural territory has a village.547 This concentration of small hamlets would have made it 
impossible for the Pact attacker to bypass one village without running into another. The 
primary exceptions to this were the cities of Frankfurt, Nürnberg, and München. 
Frankfurt served as the center for West German road and air communications and would 
have been a critical junction for NATO.548 
 The northernmost corps in CENTAG was the West German III Corps. The West 
Germans held from the southwest Harz Mountains to the northern portion of the famous 
Fulda Gap. The Göttingen Gap runs through the northern part of this sector and 
consisted of mostly open terrain dotted with a few forests and the towns of Göttingen 
and Kassel. The area naturally channeled attacking forces and was more defensible in 
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the east, closer to the IGB.549 The Gap extended for 45 kilometers from the southwestern 
Harz Mountains to the Werra River near Witzenhausen.550 One should keep in mind that 
though the phrase ‘gap’ is used to refer to several of the features of the terrain in 
southern West Germany these areas were not wide, flat plains like the American Great 
Plains. A ‘gap’ refers to a strip of ground that is less broken and covered with ridges and 
forests than the surrounding area. A ‘gap’ will always have features that limit visibility 
to some degree and will generally end upon reaching a major land formation. In the case 
of the Göttingen Gap the Weser-Leine Highlands served as the backdrop to the west. 
South of the Gap the Werra Woods close up the terrain and are covered by the Werra 
River along their eastern edge. This combination of a river backed by forests made a 
strong defensive position against attacks coming from East Germany.551 Further south 
the West German III Corps shared the responsibility of defending the Fulda Gap with the 
US V Corps. 
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 The sector of the US V Corps contained the most famous ‘gap’ in all of West 
Germany. Many analysts in the 1980s commented on how the Fulda Gap provided 
Soviet forces an open road to Frankfurt and the Rhine. A detailed examination of the 
geography of this region reveals that these analysts engaged in some understandable 
hyperbole. There was no clearly defined Fulda Gap but rather an area of more open 
ground. Three hills provided boundaries to this area, the Knüllgebirge Hill on the north 
side, the Rhön rock formation on the south side, and the Vogelsberg Hill in the center of 
the gap southwest of the town of Fulda.552 At its widest the gap was 20-30 kilometers 
wide.553 This limited the size of a force attacking through the gap to around two 
divisions at a time.554 South of the Rhön stood the Grabfeld Gap, which primarily 
consisted of the Grabfeld Plain. The Plain was an area of open terrain dotted with towns 
such as Schweinfurt and Würzburg and crisscrossed by the Main River.555 The River 
would have provided a natural barrier and defensive position for the US forces defending 
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the Gap. The border between V US Corps and VII US Corps was the southeastern edge 
of the Grabfeld Gap around the city of Coburg. 
 Coburg was located right next to the IGB and VII US Corps would have sought 
to take advantage of this urban area. Valleys to the south of Coburg as well as the Main 
River serve to direct attacking forces toward Bamberg to the south. To the east of 
Coburg the densely wooded Frankenwald was impassable to cross-country movement. 
The Hof Corridor was bordered on the north by the Frankenwald and on the south by the 
Fichtelgebirge, a ground swell covered in forests and large boulders. The Corridor “is an 
irregular zone of relatively flat ground measuring approximately 6 kilometers wide, and 
40 kilometers along the north-south axis”556 that ran between these two features. The 
width of the corridor would have limited the formations that could be brought to bear 
against defenders. To the west of the border region the Main River ran back and forth, 
making a series of defensive barriers that US forces would have utilized. The US VII 
Corps was responsible down to a position just south of the intersection of West 
Germany, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. 
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 The most southern NATO corps was the II West German Corps which held the 
200 kilometers line south to the intersection of West Germany, Czechoslovakia, and 
Austria.557 This area was dominated at the border by the dense forests and hills of the 
Böhmerwald that ran from northwest to southeast. This natural barrier to movement was 
paralleled by the Bayerischerwald roughly 50 kilometers to the west. The 
Bayerisherwald was composed of similar terrain. To the west of the Bayerischerald lay 
the Danube River Valley and the urban sprawl Munich. The northern Alps reached into 
this sector and were crisscrossed by numerous streams and rivers that ran along a north-
south axis.558 The mountains as well as the water formations formed a series of 
defensive fall back positions. II West German Corps had to plan for a potential Soviet 
attack through Austria that would have tried to outflank CENTAG to the south. 
Conclusion 
 Overall the terrain in West Germany was rather suitable for defensive 
operations.559 The combination of urban areas, good east-west road networks, rivers, 
extensive forests, and hilly or mountainous terrain made NATO’s objective much more 
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attainable. In general NATO’s doctrine of Forward Defense would have allowed NATO 
forces to utilize as much of the good defensive terrain in West Germany as possible. The 
‘gaps’ that had more open and flat terrain were generally flanked on both sides by 
powerful defensive barriers that would have given NATO forces concealed positions 
from which to fire on attacking units moving through the ‘gaps’. Different parts of the 
NATO defensive line had varying terrain features but all could take advantage of these 
features to delay and defeat Pact forces. Warsaw Pact regimental, division, and army 
commanders would have had an understanding of the geography of West Germany and 
certainly would have been aware of these obstacles. However it is unrealistic to expect 
that Pact forces would be as familiar with the terrain they were attacking through as the 
NATO forces defending. Therefore Pact attackers would suffer delays and unexpected 
concentrations due to this lack of comparable familiarity.560 The weather would not have 
posed a serious challenge to military operations on either side aside from creating 
marshy conditions in the North German Plain. On the whole NATO’s objective of 
securing West Germany would have been made easier by the geography of West 
Germany. 
                                                 









 While the outcome of naval and aerial operations would played an important role 
in a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, at the end of the day they were only peripheral 
events. The fight between the soldiers and vehicles of NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
would have been the decisive action of the invasion. The war would be decided on the 
ground and therefore it is necessary to have an understanding of the nature, deployment, 
size, and equipment of the ground forces involved.  
Location and Size 
 The reinforcement capabilities of each alliance system have already been 
examined and so it possible to consider the locations of each side’s forces and the 
direction in which these forces would be employed at the outset of a conflict in Central 
Europe. Table 13 and Table 14 show the forces that each side would have had available 
at the start of combat, based on mobilization plans and capabilities. Figure 13 shows the 
corps sectors for each of the NATO national corps. 
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Table 13 Warsaw Pact Invasion Forces561 
Invasion Front Forward Divisions562 Operational Reserve 
Divisions563
Jutland 3 2 
Coastal 3  
Central 9 5 
Luxembourg 9 5 
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Table 14 NATO Defensive Forces564 
Corps Sector Forward Divisions565 Operational Reserve 
Divisions 
Denmark 2 1/3 2 2/3566
NORTHAG567   4 2/3  
I Netherlands 2 1 
I West German 5 2 
I UK 2 2 2/3 
I Belgian 1 1/3 1 
CENTAG  4 2/3 
III West German 3 2 1/3 
V US 2 1/3 1 1/3 
VII US 2 1/3 1 2/3 
II West German 3 3 
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Figure 13 NATO Corps Sectors568 
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The Jutland Front would have attacked towards Denmark with the Coastal Front 
following behind a few days later. The Central Front would have focused its attack on I 
UK Corps while the Luxembourg Front would have moved through the Fulda Gap to 
attack V US and III West German Corps. The Bavarian Front would have attacked II 
West German Corps. The attack directions just indicated are the areas where the main 
assault would fall. The Central, Luxembourg, and Bavarian Fronts would have launched 
secondary attacks with a few of their frontal divisions in order to tie down NATO’s other 
forward forces. In the Jutland and Coastal Fronts the main attack would have tied down 
all of the forward divisions. The main attack for the three major Fronts569 would have 
been launched by 6 divisions each attacking along a 15 kilometer portion of the front.570 
Each attacking division would have attacked with two regiments on the front line and 
one regiment ready to reinforce success.571 The main weight of the Warsaw Pact was 
weighted towards the parts of West Germany where deep penetrations would be useful. 
The Jutland Front would always have been limited in its options for maneuver by the sea 
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on its right flank. French forces and US units taking advantage of POMCUS would have 
been well placed to counter such penetrations.572 
Force to Space Ratios 
An important consideration for ground combat is the subject of force to space 
ratios. The basic point is that there are only so many troops and vehicles that can be used 
effectively along a certain frontage due to the potential for overcrowding and loss of 
tactical flexibility and maneuverability. This principle applies to the offense as well as 
the defense though in different ways. The greater the density of the defending forces the 
less progress the attacker will make, even if the attacker has achieved the maximum 
density of attacking forces. In the face of air and artillery strikes, historically it has been 
difficult concentrate more than one heavy division along a 13 kilometer frontage due to 
vehicle congestion.573 However when attacking forces approach the maximum attacking 
density their losses are proportionately greater.574 On the defense one heavy division has 
been able to hold 25-35 kilometers of front and a brigade has been able to hold 7-15 
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kilometers depending on the terrain.575 Terrain with greater defensive potential could be 
held by fewer defending forces.  
 
 
Table 15 NATO Corps Force to Space Ratios576 









Denmark577 70 7 8 10 
NORTHAG   14  
I Netherlands 40 6 3 6.6 
I West German 75 15 6 5 
I UK 70 6 8 11.6 
I Belgian 35 4 3 8.75 
CENTAG   14  
III West German 85 9 7 9.4 
V US 85 7 4 12.1 
VII US 130 7 5 18.5 
II West German 200 9 9 22.2 
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 Table 15 shows the approximate frontage that each NATO corps was assigned to 
defend as well as the number of brigades assigned to defend that sector. 
The excellent defensive opportunities created by the terrain in West Germany 
have already been discussed. Therefore each brigade would have been able to effectively 
hold a defensive sector closer to 15 kilometers rather than 7.578 At the points where the 
Warsaw Pact chose to launch their main attacks the concentration of attacking forces 
would have been around one regiment every 7.5 kilometers. Therefore even at those 
points where Pact pressure was greatest NATO would have defended with odds less than 
2:1. In some parts of NATO’s line, such as the I West German and I Netherlands Corps, 
there were almost too many forward brigades in the corps sector. This would have 
created the opportunity for the reserves of these sectors to be utilized as reinforcements 
for more threatened portions of the line. Additionally NORTHAG and CENTAG both 
maintained large reserves that could also be used to shore up defending brigades under 
heavy pressure. The conclusion of US General Glenn Otis, commander of CENTAG in 
the 1980s that “the first echelon of the Soviet forces is going to have a whale of a time 
                                                 
578 See Chapter 10: Terrain and Weather for complete discussion of West Germany terrain 
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doing anything to us”579 seems to be accurate if a bit grandiose. It seems that the 
inherent advantages in the defense, combined with NATO’s density of defending forces 
would have made a Pact breakthrough very difficult.  
Equipment 
 On the whole NATO equipment was more technologically advanced than the 
Warsaw Pact’s. An examination of how this statement worked itself out in each area of 
equipment would be exhausting. An analysis of the capabilities of main battle tanks on 
both sides will suffice as an example of NATO’s superiority in qualitative comparisons. 
Warsaw Pact tanks were not as accurate at long ranges and could not fire as rapidly as 
NATO tanks due to lower quality controls in production.580 NATO’s tanks had passive 
infrared systems that allowed them to see through fog, dust, and smoke while Pact tanks 
had to use infrared searchlights that gave away their position.581 Pact tanks were 
designed to be cheap and mass produced and were kept in service un-upgraded far 
longer than NATO tanks. European NATO nations often kept older tanks in service, just 
                                                 
579 Odorizzi and Schemmer, "An Exclusive AFJ Interview with General Glenn K Otis," 47. 
580 Bluth, "The Warsaw Pact and Military Security in Central Europe During the Cold War," 301. 




as Eastern European nations did, but NATO members would upgrade their tanks with 
fire control systems, new main guns, and improved visibility capabilities that made the 
older tanks almost as capable as newer models.582 While experience in the Middle East 
is not directly applicable to combat in Central Europe, Israel had been able to achieve 
tank exchange rates of 3:1 and 4:1 using NATO tanks against Soviet tanks.583 
Additionally NATO’s modernization programs of the late 1970s and early 1980s meant 
that by 1987 a much higher percentage of NATO’s tank fleet had been constructed 
recently than the Warsaw Pact’s.584 Pact tanks were often less reliable than NATO tanks 
again due to lower quality controls in production. This examination of main battle tanks 
has shown that NATO’s vehicles were generally superior in construction, capabilities, 
and reliability. While there were some exceptions, such as in bridging equipment NATO 
generally had an advantage in terms of the sophistication of equipment, whether 
vehicles, radios, or small arms.  
                                                 
582 Ibid.: 26. 
583 Miller and Lynn-Jones, eds., Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy, 131, Hillier, 
"Strengthening NATO: POMCUS and Other Approaches," 21. 
584 Chambers and Unterseher, "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets," 8, 
Hoffenaar and Findlay, "Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War: An Oral 




 Given the force ratios involved on the main Pact axis of attack and NATO’s 
defensive in those sectors it does not seem that the Pact would have been able to attain 
the concentration of firepower needed to break clean through NATO’s lines. The 
presences of significant reserves on both sides increased the potential for those reserves 
to be drawn into battles of reinforcement at the main points of attack. NATO’s 
deployment allowed its more spread out forces, CENTAG, to utilize the best defensive 
terrain in West Germany to counterattack the lesser density. However the decrease in 
density from NORTHAG to CENTAG was well within the historical limits of a 
brigade’s defensive capabilities. On the whole it seems that the Pact could have made 
steady but slow progress along its 3 main axis of attack. NATO would have reinforced 









 Perhaps the most important conclusion of this study is a sense of heartfelt relief 
that war never did break out between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The concentration of 
hundreds of thousands of troops, tens of thousands of vehicles, thousands of aircraft, and 
hundreds of warships would have produced a carnage not seen since the Second World 
War. The great advances made in technology since that war would only ensure that a 
war in Central Europe dealt out death and destruction on a massive scale at frightening 
speed. The displacement of civilians, the obliteration of cities and the countryside of 
West Germany, and the death toll would have been horrific. The study of warfare should 
always lead to a desire for its prevention and this work is no different.  
 In terms of more technical findings this factor analysis has shown NATO’s 
overall superiority, if not supremacy, in 1987. NATO’s allies were generally more 
reliable in combat situations than the Warsaw Pacts. NATO’s strategy was well suited 
for defensive purposes while the Pact would have faced key challenges in the areas of 
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logistics and initiative. Additionally the Soviet Union’s emphasis on nuclear operations 
tied down critical naval and air forces in missions not directly germane to the ground 
operations in Central Europe. Operations on Europe’s flanks would have generally seen 
NATO forces holding their ground although not able to significantly reinforce the 
Central Front. At sea NATO’s maritime strength seems to have been quite capable of 
achieving its SLOC protection objectives given NATO’s numerical superiority in 
warships and the Soviet Union’s misemployment of its most advanced maritime units in 
SSBN protection and attacks on NATO carriers. Aerial operations would have given 
NATO an edge although not as complete or certain as at sea. NATO gained more ground 
combat power through the reinforcement and mobilization process than the Warsaw Pact 
did, primarily because the vast majority of Soviet forces in the USSR would not have 
been combat ready until two weeks after combat commenced. Both sides were generally 
capable of supplying their initial combat needs in terms of material and both would have 
suffered shortages in munitions especially after a few weeks of combat. In terms of 
ground forces NATO seems to have the defensive forces necessary to thwart a Warsaw 
Pact breakthrough and to hold Pact advances inside West Germany. The Alliance’s 
modernization efforts through the late 1970s and 1980s seem to have borne fruit by 
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1987, giving NATO the tools to defend West Germany. Given all of these factors NATO 
seems to have been in a position to defeat a Warsaw Pact invasion. 
 One particular factor of Soviet strategy would have worked rather significantly to 
inhibit the appropriate deployment of Soviet air and naval forces in this conflict. This 
was the Soviet preoccupation with securing a favorable change in the strategic nuclear 
balance favorable. The United States certainly sought a similar change but did not design 
its conventional force doctrine around this desire, as the Soviet Union did. The United 
States sought to secure this change more through deploying more capable nuclear 
systems rather than utilizing conventional forces to achieve this end. For the Soviets 
conventional forces were to aid in securing this change and then be deployed against 
other conventional forces. If a large number of Soviet SSBNS were destroyed by 
NATO’s ASW efforts then the strategic balance would shift against the Soviet Union. 
Therefore the protection of these submarines became the highest priority of the Soviet 
Navy. The presence of US carriers near the Soviet Union also presented a possible 
change in the strategic balance as they carriers could strike Soviet territory with nuclear 
weapons on short notice. As a result the Soviet Navy’s second task was the destruction 
of US carriers and their aircraft. The consequence of these two priorities was to tie down 
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many of the maritime units that should have been attacking NATO’s lines of 
communication. In the aerial spectrum the Soviets were primarily concerned with 
retaining their strategic air defense fighters and destroying NATO’s theater nuclear 
weapons. This focused the efforts of their tactical attack aircraft on targets whose 
destruction did not materially aid the advance of Warsaw Pact ground forces. 
Additionally this limited the deployment of Warsaw Pact fighter aircraft in defense 
against NATO’s air strikes. The Soviet insistence on the preservation of their nuclear 
fighting capability is understandable given the horrific casualties they suffered during 
the Second World War and the resultant desire to maintain a deterrent that would 
prevent those losses from ever being repeated. However this emphasis on a potential 
nuclear war hindered the contribution that Soviet air and naval forces could have made 
to defeating NATO. 
 NATO’s members were an interesting mixture with different priorities, histories, 
military doctrines, political views, and interests. Some members of the Alliance, such as 
Belgium, were primarily interested in satisfying the minimum in NATO commitments 
and requirements. Other nations, such as the Netherlands and West Germany, sought to 
maximize their limited national defense resources in making the best contribution to 
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NATO that they could. These differences were most visibly seen in NATO’s long 
struggle to achieve some level of standardization and commonality in equipment, 
procedures, and doctrine between its members. Generally NATO’s militaries followed 
the traditional Western model of preferring smaller professional armies lavishly trained 
and equipped. The greater economic power of the Alliance resulted in more advanced 
equipment and the ability to purchase large quantities of pre-positioned material. While 
NATO’s future is uncertain given the lack of a common strategic threat to national 
sovereignty by the end of the Cold War the Alliance had made the necessary exertions to 
fulfill its commitment to protect the territorial integrity of its members.  
 It is important to keep in mind that no level of analysis can provide ironclad 
guarantees about the performance of military forces, past or present. What Clausewitz 
referred to as “friction” in warfare, the random events, difficulties, and opportunities that 
spring up, cannot be taken into account in this type of factor analysis. What can be done 
is a comparison of quantitative and qualitative factors that are most often the guides for 
the outcome of conflict. This allows for suggesting the most probable outcome in a given 
scenario. The rather different conclusion of this work, as compared to the conclusions of 
defense analysts during the Cold War, many of whom utilized similar techniques, 
 
 209
demonstrates the importance of delaying judgment about military capabilities until all 
the evidence is available. This study is not definitive in that greater declassification in 
the future may well reveal information that challenges the conclusions of this work. The 
history of the Cold War is still a relatively new field and time will be needed for the 
discipline to mature based on a common body of evidence. That evidence is more 
available for research purposes than 20 years ago but important gaps still remain to be 
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WARSAW PACT TREATY585 
“Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the 
People’s Republic of Albania, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the 
Hungarian People’s Republic, the German Democratic Public, the Polish 
People’s Republic, the Romanian People’s Republic, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Republic” 
 
Warsaw, Poland- May 14, 1955 
The Contracting Parties, reaffirming their desire for the establishment of a system of 
European collective security based on the participation of all European states 
irrespective their social and political systems, which would make it possible to unite 
their efforts in safeguarding the peace of Europe; mindful, at the same time, of the 
situation created in Europe by the ratification of the Paris agreements, which envisage 
the formation of a new military alignment in the shape of "Western European Union," 
with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany and the integration of the 
latter in the North-Atlantic bloc, which increased the danger of another war and 
constitutes a threat to the national security of the peaceable states; being persuaded that 
in these circumstances the peaceable European states must take the necessary measures 
to safeguard their security and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe; guided by 
the objects and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization; being 
desirous of further promoting and developing friendship, cooperation and mutual 
assistance in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and 
sovereignty of states and of noninterference in their internal affairs, have decided to 
conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and have 
for that purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries: 
                                                 








The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, 
and to settle their international disputes peacefully and in such manner as will not 
jeopardize international peace and security.  
Article 2 
The Contracting Parties declare their readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere 
cooperation in all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and 
security, and will fully devote their energies to the attainment of this end.  
The Contracting Parties will furthermore strive for the adoption, in agreement with other 
states which may desire to cooperate in this, of effective measures for universal 
reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass 
destruction.  
Article 3 
The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international 
issues affecting their common interests, guided by the desire to strengthen international 
peace and security.  
They shall immediately consult with one another whenever, in the opinion of any one of 
them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty has arisen, in 




In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any 
state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to 
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with 
other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all 
such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall 
immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in 
order to restore and maintain international peace and security.  
Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be reported to the Security Council in 
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. These 
measures shall be discontinued immediately the Security Council adopts the necessary 
measures to restore and maintain international peace and security.  
Article 5 
The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces 
that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command, which shall 
function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other 
agreed measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the 
peaceful labours of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and 
territories, and provide defence against possible aggression.  
Article 6 
For the purpose of the consultations among the Parties envisaged in the present Treaty, 
and also for the purpose of examining questions which may arise in the operation of the 
Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall be set up, in which each of the Parties to 
the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its Government or by another 
specifically appointed representative.  




The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not 
to conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the present 
Treaty.  
The Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international 
treaties do not conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.  
Article 8 
The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation 
with a view to further developing and fostering economic and cultural intercourse with 
one another, each adhering to the principle of respect for the independence and 
sovereignty of the others and non-interference in their internal affairs.  
Article 9 
The present Treaty is open to the accession of other states, irrespective of their social 
and political systems, which express their readiness by participation in the present Treaty 
to assist in uniting the efforts of the peaceable states in safeguarding the peace and 
security of the peoples. Such accession shall enter into force with the agreement of the 
Parties to the Treaty after the declaration of accession has been deposited with the 
Government of the Polish People's Republic.  
Article 10 
The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.  
The Treaty shall enter into force on the day the last instrument of ratification has been 
deposited. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall notify the other Parties 
to the Treaty as each instrument of ratification is deposited.  
Article 11 
The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For such Contracting Parties 
as do not at least one year before the expiration of this period present to the Government 
 
 233
of the Polish People's Republic a statement of denunciation of the Treaty, it shall remain 
in force for the next ten years.  
Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European 
Treaty of Collective Security concluded for this purpose, for which the Contracting 
Parties will unswervingly strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the 
day the General European Treaty enters into force. ..  
Done in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, in one copy each in the Russian, Polish, Czech and 
German languages, all texts being equally authentic. Certified copies of the present 
Treaty shall be sent by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to all the Parties 
to the Treaty.  







“The North Atlantic Treaty” 
Washington, DC- April 4, 1949 
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all 
governments.  
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their 
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. 
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.  
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of 
peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:  
Article 1 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any 
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations.  
Article 2 
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly 
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better 
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by 
promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in 
                                                 




their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration 
between any or all of them.  
Article 3 
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately 
and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain 
and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.  
Article 4 
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.  
Article 5 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, 
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of 
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.  
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be 
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace 
and security.  
Article 6 (1) 
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to 
include an armed attack:  
• on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian 
Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the 
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jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of 
Cancer;  
• on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these 
territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the 
Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the 
Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.  
Article 7 
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights 
and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United 
Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.  
Article 8 
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it 
and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this 
Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with 
this Treaty.  
Article 9 
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to 
consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so 
organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such 
subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a 
defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 
3 and 5.  
Article 10 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position 
to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the 
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Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United 
States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of 
the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.  
Article 11 
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance 
with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, 
which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into 
force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority 
of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and 
shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their 
ratifications. (3)  
Article 12 
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties 
shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the 
Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North 
Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements 
under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.  
Article 13 
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party 
one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United 
States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit 






This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly 
certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other 
signatories.  
1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 
2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and 
Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.  
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former 
Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this 
Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962. 
3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the 






CHURCHILL ON MOBILIZATION587 
 
 Prime Minister to General Ismay, for Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S. 
(Copy to C.-in-C. Home Forces.) 
The statement that one division could not be transferred from Great Britain to Ireland in 
less than eleven days, no matter how great the emergency nor how careful the previous 
preparations, is one which deserves your earnest attention. When we remember the 
enormous numbers which were moved from Dunkirk to Dover and the Thames last May 
under continued enemy attack, it is clear that the movement of personnel cannot be the 
limiting factor. The problem is therefore one of the movement of the artillery and 
vehicles. This surely deserves special study. Let me see the exact programme which 
occupies the eleven days, showing the order in which men, guns, and vehicles will 
embark. This would show perhaps that, say, nine-tenths of the division might come into 
action in much less than eleven days. Or, again, a portion of the mechanical transport, 
stores, and even some of the artillery, including Bren gun-carriers, might be found from 
reserves in this country and sent to Ireland in advance, where they would be none the 
less a reserve for us, assuming no need in Ireland arose. Surely now that we have the 
time some ingenuity might be shown in shortening this period of eleven days to move 
fifteen thousand fighting men from one well-equipped port to another- the voyage taking 
only a few hours. Itf necessary some revision of the scale of approved establishments 
might be made in order to achieve the high tactical object of a more rapid transference 
and deployment. 
 We must remember that in the recent training exercise "Victor" five German 
divisions, two of which were armoured and one motorised, were [supposed to be] landed 
in about forty-eight hours in the teeth of strenuous opposition, not at a port with quays 
and cranes, but on the open beaches. If we assume that the Germans can do this, or even 
half of it, we must contrast this with the statement of the eleven days required to shift 
one division from the Clyde to Belfast. We have also the statement of the Chiefs of Staff 
                                                 
587 Winston Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance, vol. 3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1950), 731. 
 
 240
Committee that it would take thirty days to land one British division unopposed 
alongside the quays and piers of Tangier. Perhaps the officers who worked out the 
landings of the Germans under "Victor" could make some suggestion for moving this 
division into Ireland via Belfast without taking eleven days to do it. Who are the officers 
who worked out the details that this move will take eleven days? Would it not be wise to 
bring them into contact with the other officers who landed these vast numbers of 
Germans on our beaches so swiftly and enables whole armoured divisions and motorised 
troops to come into full action in forty-eight hours? 
 Evidently it would be wiser to keep the option of moving this division as long as 
possible, and in order to do this we must have the best plan worked out to bring the 
largest possible portion of the division into action in Ireland in the shortest possible time. 
I am not prepared to approve the transfer of the divisions until this inquiry has been 
made. There must be an effort to reconcile the evident discrepancies as between what we 
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